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I. INTRODUCTION 
o international legal obligations only bind States,3 as 
monolithic entities, or do they also oblige their State or-
gans?  This distinction poses an important question because, 
inter alia, a sense of direct obligation can lead State organs to 
respect international norms and, thus, may increase interna-
tional law’s effectiveness worldwide.4  While many international 
law scholars assume that international obligations bind the 
State, but not its organs, an increasing amount of case law from 
international courts now challenges this assumption. 
On March 3, 1999, the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) 
indicated provisional measures against the United States 
(“U.S.”) at the request of Germany, to halt the pending execu-
tion of Walter LaGrand in Arizona.5  After explicitly noting that 
“the Governor of Arizona is under the obligation to act in con-
formity with the international undertakings of the [U.S.],”6 the 
Court indicated inter alia that “(a) The [U.S.] should take all 
measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not 
  
 3. Throughout this article, the capitalized term “State” will refer to the 
nation-state (e.g., Malaysia), and “state” to states in a union (e.g., Arizona), 
except where citations require otherwise. 
 4. See Philip Allott, State Responsibility and The Unmaking of Interna-
tional Law, 29 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 14 (1988).  As Phillip Allott observed:  
The moral effect of the law is vastly reduced if the human agents in-
volved are able to separate themselves personally both from the du-
ties the law imposes and from the responsibility, which it entails.  
The moral discontinuity between the personal obligations of the gov-
ernment official and the obligations of the government is the cause 
and effect of the legal discontinuity between international law and 
municipal law.  These discontinuities sustain each other.  
Id.  See also ANDRÉ NOLLKAEMPER, DE DIALECTIEK TUSSEN INDIVIDUELE EN 
COLLECTIEVE AANSPRAKELIJKHEID IN HET VOLKENRECHT [THE DIALECTIC 
BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW] 
8–10 (2000) [hereinafter NOLLKAEMPER] (on file with the Brooklyn Journal of 
International Law); A.J.P. Tammes, The Binding Force of International Obli-
gations of States for Persons Under Their Jurisdiction, in DECLARATIONS ON 
PRINCIPLES: A QUEST FOR UNIVERSAL PEACE 57, 59 (R.J. Akkerman et al. eds., 
1977) (“The international community must consider it a reinforcement of gen-
eral international law that subordinates are bound separately from the com-
prehensive bodies, and are not just submerged in their shadow.”).  
 5. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104. 
 6. Id. at para. 16.  
D 
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executed pending the final decision in these proceedings” and 
“(b) the [U.S.] Government…should transmit this Order to the 
Governor of the State of Arizona.”7 
The ICJ’s finding in LaGrand stands at odds with the domi-
nant view in international law, which envisages the State as a 
black-box.  Under this theory, international law can insert its 
demands in the box, requiring certain results to come out of it; 
however, it cannot determine how these results are reached 
within the box.  Thus, under black-box theory, the State must 
ensure that its organs comply with its international obliga-
tions.8  Accordingly, the ICJ would have had to limit its findings 
to address U.S. obligations instead of also determining the Gov-
ernor of Arizona’s responsibilities.  Indeed, the ICJ normally 
only pronounces on States’ international obligations, not State 
organs. 
Like LaGrand, many other cases exist that contradict black-
box theory and assume that State organs directly hold obliga-
tions under international law, independent of any national re-
ception.  In fact, a rich line of national case law exists in this 
respect.9  This Article will provide an overview of relevant in-
  
 7. Id.  
 8. See Patrick M. McFadden, Provincialism in United States Courts, 81 
CORNELL L. REV. 4, at 44–45 (1995).  Patrick McFadden explains that: 
[Black-box] theory conceives international law as imposing its obliga-
tions only on each state as a whole, and not on any of its constituent 
organs.  It is a matter for each state to determine which of its organs 
shall execute the nation’s international responsibilities, and each of 
these organs, consequently, must await an internal signal to operate. 
Id. 
 9. See generally Thomas Buergenthal, International Tribunals and Na-
tional Courts: The Internationalization of Domestic Adjudication, in RECHT 
ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR RUDOLF BERNHARDT 
[LAW BETWEEN CHANGE AND CONSERVATION: LIBER AMICORUM RUDOLF 
BERNHARDT] 687 (Ulrich Beyerlin et al. ed., 1995) [hereinafter Buergenthal, 
International Tribunals]; BENEDETTO CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
ROLE OF DOMESTIC LEGAL SYSTEMS (René Provost trans., 1993) [hereinafter 
CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW]; ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
DOMESTIC COURTS (Benedetto Conforti & Francesco Francioni eds., 1997); 
Rosalyn Higgins, Dualism in the Face of a Changing Legal Culture, in 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE, LIBER AMICORUM IN HONOUR 
OF LORD SLYNN OF HADLEY 9 (Gordon Slynn Hadley et al. eds., 2000) [hereinaf-
ter Higgins, Dualism]; Rosalyn Higgins, The Concept of “The State”: Variable 
Geometry and Dualist Perceptions, in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN QUEST 
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ternational case law and will argue that international courts’ 
(recent) involvement strengthens the challenge to black-box 
theory.  In addition, this Article will argue that this challenge is 
both evidence and a consequence of the changing character of 
international law.  The concept of State organ obligation will 
improve compliance with international law, but will also make 
international law’s deficiencies a more pressing problem. 
The question of whether international obligations directly 
bind State organs has practical relevance in a multitude of 
ways.  First, this issue may influence national authorities’ will-
  
OF EQUITY AND UNIVERSALITY: LIBER AMICORUM GEORGES ABI-SAAB 547 (Geor-
ges Abi-Saab et al. eds., 2001) [hereinafter Higgins, The Concept]; 
INTERNATIONAL LAW DECISIONS IN NATIONAL COURTS (Thomas M. Franck & 
Gregory H. Fox eds., 1996) [hereinafter DECISIONS]; Reem Bahdi, Globaliza-
tion of Judgment: Transjudicialism and the Five Faces of International Law in 
Domestic Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 555, 555 (2002); Eyal Ben-
venisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs: A Comment on the Institut de Droit Inter-
national’s Resolution on ‘The Activities of National Courts and the Interna-
tional Relations of their State’, 5 EUR. J. INT’L L. 423 (1994) [hereinafter Ben-
venisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs]; Benedetto Conforti, Notes on the Rela-
tionship Between International and National Law, 3 INT’L L.F. 18 (2001) [here-
inafter Conforti, Notes]; Gennady M. Danilenko, Implementation of Interna-
tional Law in CIS States: Theory and Practice, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 51 (1999); 
Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective 
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273 (1997); Karen Knop, Here and 
There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 501, 
501–02 (2000); Felice Morgenstern, Judicial Practice and the Supremacy of 
International Law, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 42 (1951); Justice Michael Kirby, 
Law & Justice Foundation of New South Wales: Justice Kirby’s Papers, at 
http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/resources/kirby/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2003); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of Transjudicial Communication, 29 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 100 (1994); The International Judicial Dialogue: When Domestic 
Constitutional Courts Join the Conversation, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2049, 2049 
(2001).  See also Miscellaneous (Bangalore Principles 4 and 7), reported in 14 
COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1196, 1197 (1988).  According to the Bangalore prin-
ciples:   
[T]here is a growing tendency for national courts to have regard to 
these international norms for the purpose of deciding cases where the 
domestic law — whether constitutional, statute or common law — is 
uncertain or incomplete….It is within the proper nature of the judi-
cial process and well-established judicial functions for national courts 
to have regard to international obligations which a country under-
takes — whether or not they have been incorporated into domestic 
law — for the purpose of removing ambiguity or uncertainty from na-
tional constitutions, legislation or common law. 
Id. 
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ingness to comply with international law, either directly or in-
directly, through public pressure.10  That this matter can be one 
of life or death was demonstrated when the Governor of Texas 
announced that he did not feel legally obliged to obey the ICJ’s 
February 5, 2003 Order to stay the execution of two Mexican 
prisoners on death-row in Texas.11  Second, international courts’ 
determinations that State organs should heed the call of inter-
national law, regardless of national implementation, can also 
provide inspiring examples for litigation in U.S. courts, espe-
cially in human rights cases.  Third, international law’s effect 
on State organs also underlies many practical issues regarding 
national legal orders in general.  For example, to what extent 
should courts defer to the executive branch in determining 
whether treaties are self-executing?12  Is the male captus bene 
detentus principle viable?13  The suggestion that jus cogens 
norms may bind national courts, in defiance of the normal im-
plementation framework, forms a particular example of State 
organ obligation that challenges black-box theory.14 
  
 10. See Douglas Cassel, Judicial Remedies for Treaty Violations in Crimi-
nal Cases: Consular Rights of Foreign Nationals in United States Death Pen-
alty Cases, 12 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 851, 855 (1999) [hereinafter Cassel, Judi-
cial Remedies]. 
 11. See infra note 130.   
 12. See generally Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Self-Executing Treaties and the 
Impact of International Law on National Legal Systems: A Research Guide, 26 
INT’L J. OF LEGAL INFO. 56–159 (1998).   
 13. See Paul Mitchell, English-Speaking Justice: Evolving Responses to 
Transnational Forcible Abduction After Alvarez-Machain, 29 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 383, 392 (1996) (“[A]s a matter of international law domestic courts must 
ensure that a state’s international legal obligations are carried out.  Accord-
ingly, courts are under a duty to stay proceedings against a fugitive who has 
been brought before them in violation of international law.  The existence of 
this duty is the central issue….”). 
 14. See, e.g., U.S. v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(“Kidnapping also does not qualify as a jus cogens norm, such that its commis-
sion would be justiciable in our courts even absent a domestic law.”); Comm. of 
United States Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 935 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988).  The Court explained: 
When our government’s two political branches, acting together, con-
travene an international legal norm, does this court have any author-
ity to remedy the violation?  The answer is “no” if the type of interna-
tional obligation that Congress and the President violate is either a 
treaty or a rule of customary international law.  If, on the other hand, 
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This Article’s primary agenda, however, is not simply to show 
exceptions to black-box theory, but to challenge its accuracy as 
the default rule in international law.  It is well known and in-
creasingly recognized that there are certain phenomena in the 
reception of international law for which the theory cannot ac-
count.15  Nevertheless, despite all of its shortcomings, the black-
box theory remains pervasive in theory and practice, as this 
Article will demonstrate later.  Scholars tend to treat divergent 
phenomena as proverbial exceptions that confirm the rule, in-
stead of evidence that the theory requires revision.  This Article 
will focus on how international law discourse still considers 
State organ obligation as a predominantly alien concept and 
will show how the theory may change from the rule to the ex-
ception.   
This Article will move from a high level of generality to a 
more specific discussion of the issues involved.  First, the Arti-
cle will provide a concise exposition of black-box theory and its 
acceptance in practice, taking a top-down perspective of inter-
national law that does not concern itself with specific interna-
tional obligations (e.g., treaty or custom)16 or the State organs 
involved (e.g., parts of a federation or of an internal separation 
of powers in legislative, executive and judicial organs).17  Ac-
cordingly, while this Article will focus mostly on courts, the 
  
Congress and the President violate a peremptory norm (or jus co-
gens), the domestic legal consequences are unclear. 
Id.  See generally Erika de Wet, The Prohibition of Torture as an International 
Norm of Jus Cogens and Its Implications for National and Customary Law, 15 
EUR. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2004) (on file with author). 
 15. See McFadden, supra note 8, at 46–47.  
 16. Cf. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE 
RESPONSIBILITY: INTRODUCTION, TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 125 (James Craw-
ford ed., 2002) [hereinafter ILC ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY] (Article 12 
states: “There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an 
act of that State is not in conformity with what is required of it by that obliga-
tion, regardless of its origin or character.”).    
 17. See id. at 94.  As Article 94 states: 
The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that 
State under international law, whether the organ exercises legisla-
tive, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it 
holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as 
an organ of the central government or of a territorial unit of the 
State.   
Id.   
File: Ferdinandussemacro.doc Created on:  10/19/2003 7:57 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:54 PM 
52 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:1 
term “State organ” should be understood in a broad sense and 
in principle can include any entity or actor exercising State au-
thority, be it a state in a union, province, city, agency, organ or 
official.18  As this Article will explain shortly, the black-box the-
ory is deeply embedded in international law.  Therefore, it is 
important to first challenge the categorical assertion that inter-
national obligations cannot bind State organs directly before 
refining our understanding of the concept.  While perhaps a 
rather abstract approach, this type of analysis provides a clear 
overview of the black-box theory’s broad grip on international 
obligations of all sorts.  In a similar manner, this Article will 
then set out the arguments against black-box theory using a 
broad overview of divergent case law. 
The analytical section will then become more specific as it 
will focus in on the different causes, problems and consequences 
of State organ obligation.  Clearly, whether a particular inter-
national obligation binds a particular State organ will depend 
largely on its source (e.g., treaty or decision of an international 
court), character (e.g., positive or negative obligation, obligation 
of result or obligation of conduct), content and wording.  Simi-
larly, important differences exist, for example, between territo-
rial units and courts.  Moreover, international obligations do 
not bind all State organs.  This Article’s focus, however, is on 
issues relevant to different State organs’ obligations, including 
federalism and the democratic legitimacy of the international 
obligations involved, and its focus will be thus limited.   
Part II will shortly dwell on the black-box theory’s current 
status, the practical relevance of State organ obligation, and the 
limited relevance of the non-self-executing character of certain 
treaty provisions.  After an exposé of relevant case law in Part 
III, this Article will provide an analysis in Part IV that is di-
vided into three sections.  The first section will focus on the ma-
terial changes in international law and their consequences for 
black-box theory.  The second section will lay out its own read-
ing of the model of State organ obligation that may replace the 
black-box theory.  The third will then address some policy con-
siderations, including issues of federalism, separation of powers 
  
 18. Arguably, private actors or entities exercising authority on behalf of 
the State (such as private corporations running prisons) could be considered to 
have similar obligations under international law as State organs.    
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and democratic legitimacy.  Finally, Part V concludes this Arti-
cle’s analysis of black-box theory, explaining that the trend to-
wards State organ obligation is real, developing and important. 
II. BLACK-BOX THEORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The black-box theory has a long history in international legal 
scholarship,19 and is undoubtedly the dominant theory at this 
time.  Academia has taught generations of lawyers that inter-
national law binds the State, but not its organs.20  Most academ-
ics consider exceptions possible, but only by State choice, not 
because of international law’s normative power.  For example, 
States can choose to “open the box” by virtue of a general refer-
ence to international law in their nation’s constitution.21  As a 
  
 19. The question of State organ obligation is closely connected to the long-
standing debate between monists and dualists.  See GIORGIO GAJA, DUALISM IN 
MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (2003) (Seminars on Theoretical Approaches 
to The Relationship between International and National Law, available at 
http://www1.jur.uva.nl/acil/pionier/Seminars_on_theoretical_approaches_to_th
e.htm) (last visited Apr. 9, 2003) [hereinafter GAJA] (“[D]ualists consider State 
organs to be sheltered from international law, which becomes relevant in the 
State organs’ perspective only by means of a rule pertaining to the municipal 
law system.”); Karl Josef Partsch, International Law and Municipal Law, in 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 238, 242 (Rudolf Bernhardt ed., 
1992).  As Karl Josef Partsch explains:  
The doctrine that the international legal order has to be clearly dis-
tinguished from the legal order of States has led to the concept that 
the validity of international law on the municipal plane is always 
based on the authority of the State and that it is therefore necessary 
to transform the norms of international law into internal law in order 
to make them binding on State organs (courts or administrative 
agencies) or also possibly on individuals.   
Id.  Descriptions of this debate can be found in any textbook.  See also Andrzej 
Wasilkowski, Monism and Dualism at Present, in THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AT THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF KRYSZTOF 
SKUBISZEWSKI 323–36 (Jerzy Makarczyk ed., 1996). 
 20. See, e.g., Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International 
Law Considered From the Standpoint of The Rule of Law, 92 REC DES COURS 
(LA HAYE) 5, 77 (1957 II) (“The truth is, that the concept of the State or nation 
as an indivisible entity possessing its own separate personality, is a necessary 
initial hypothesis, which has to be made before it is possible to speak signifi-
cantly of international law at all, and which is implied by the very term ‘inter-
national.’”).  
 21. See Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310, 316 (1914) (“Treaties are 
contracts between nations, and by the Constitution are made the law of the 
land.”).  As Gerald Fitzmaurice notes:   
 
File: Ferdinandussemacro.doc Created on:  10/19/2003 7:57 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:54 PM 
54 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:1 
result, State organs may find themselves bound by interna-
tional obligations.  However, such obligations of individual or-
gans are left to the discretion of the State, and are revocable at 
all times.22  From the standpoint of international law under 
black-box theory, State organs are simply invisible.23 
Surely, the black-box theory is not undisputed.  It has re-
ceived strong opposition from eminent scholars like Hersch 
Lauterpacht.24  Among contemporary scholars, the black-box 
theory has drawn fierce and principled critiques,25 more nu-
  
[T]he government, régime, head of State, etc. are merely organs of the 
State and are not the State itself, they are the agents of the State for 
carrying out its international obligations.  These are not vested in 
them as organs, but in the State they represent, though, under the 
State’s constitution, the responsibility for carrying out the State’s ob-
ligations may attach to them.   
Fitzmaurice, supra note 20, at 90–91. 
 22. See, e.g., Francis G. Jacobs, Introduction, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN 
DOMESTIC LAW xxiii, xxiv (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds., 1987).  
Francis Jacobs elaborates on the notion of State discretion as follows:  
[T]he effect of international law generally, and of treaties in particu-
lar, within the legal order of a State will always depend on a rule of 
domestic law.  The fundamental principle is that the application of 
treaties is governed by domestic constitutional law.  It is true that 
domestic law may, under certain conditions, require or permit the 
application of treaties, which are binding on the State, even if they 
have not been incorporated into domestic law.  But this application of 
treaties “as such” is prescribed by a rule of domestic constitutional 
law.  It is not a situation reached by the application of a rule of inter-
national law, since such a rule, to have effect, itself depends upon 
recognition by domestic law.    
Id. 
 23. NOLLKAEMPER, supra note 4, at 7. 
 24. INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF HERSCH 
LAUTERPACHT: VOL. I — THE GENERAL WORKS 280 (Elihu Lauterpacht ed., 
1970) (“To say that the State — and the State only — is the subject of interna-
tional duties is to say…that international duties bind no one; it is to interpose 
a screen of irresponsibility between the rule of international law and the 
agency expected to give effect to it.”).   
 25. See, e.g., Conforti, Notes, supra note 9, at 18 and 21–23.  Conforti ex-
plains:   
In all my contributions on the integration of public international law 
into the domestic legal orders I have always argued that interna-
tional rules…should be treated on the same footing as unilateral mu-
nicipal law.…The old opinion that international rules had only states 
as their addresses, that only diplomats were to deal with them, and 
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anced “problematization,”26 as well as simple denials without 
elaboration.27  Moreover, scholars have widely acknowledged 
that the theory has never been able to fully account for the 
complex and divergent practice of domestic implementation of 
international law.28  For example, the international obligation of 
States to refrain from defeating the object and purpose of a 
treaty before its entry into force would have to bind State or-
gans directly in order to gain meaningful force.29  A moderating 
role of national law is hardly feasible in this respect, as the ob-
ligation serves a preliminary and temporary role — one meant 
to precede the treaty’s operation and implementation through 
national law.30      
  
that international law was a subject to be studied in the Faculties of 
Political Science rather than in the Law Faculties, is completely 
abandoned more or less in all countries.…Are state officials bound by 
the “international” interpretation of an international rule?  It is clear 
that the interpretation embodied in binding international decisions is 
binding with regard to the specific case brought before the interna-
tional body.    
Id.  Pierre Pescatore, Conclusion, in THE EFFECT OF TREATIES IN DOMESTIC 
LAW 281–82 (Francis G. Jacobs & Shelley Roberts eds. 1987) [hereinafter 
Pescatore, Conclusion] (arguing that requiring the transformation of interna-
tional obligations allows states to abstain from internal execution and de-
prives treaties from their contractual and international character; as a result 
“incorporation procedures and methods based on ‘transformation’ are…by 
their very essence incompatible with good faith in international relations.”). 
 26. See, e.g., André Nollkaemper, The Direct Effect of Public International 
Law, in DIRECT EFFECT: RETHINKING A CLASSIC OF EC LEGAL DOCTRINE 157 
(Jolande M. Prinssen & Annette Schrauwen eds., 2002).  
 27. See, e.g., Karl Zemanek, The Legal Foundation of The International 
System: General Course on Public International Law, 266 REC DES COURS (LA 
HAYE) 9, 191 (1998) (“[I]n theory, Parliaments as State organs are bound to 
interpret international treaties in accordance with the rules embodied in the 
[Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.]”); see also Danilenko, supra note 
9, at 54 (“Although international norms bind all branches of government, do-
mestic courts probably constitute the most important organs for the imple-
mentation of international norms at the domestic level.”).  
 28. See supra notes 9, 16.  
 29. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 18, 
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 336. 
 30. See Unity Dow v. Attorney-General of Botswana [1992] L. Rep. Com-
monwealth 623, 673, available at www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/diana/cases.htm 
(last visited Oct. 5, 2003).  In Unity Dow, a domestic court struck down dis-
criminatory legislation on the basis of unincorporated treaties, noting that it 
was “bound to accept the position that [Botswana] will not deliberately enact 
laws in contravention of its international undertakings and obligations.”  Id.  
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But despite these caveats, black-box theory still reigns as the 
all-pervasive theory in international law.  International schol-
ars accept the black-box theory as the default rule, which can-
not easily be set aside.  Leading textbooks, while not insensitive 
to the changes in international law, still advance the position, 
explicitly or implicitly, that it is up to the State to determine 
the binding force of international obligations on its organs.31  
Most scholars understand even the fact that customary interna-
  
 31. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 168 (2001).  Antonio 
Cassese specifically points out that: 
States consider…the translation of international commands into do-
mestic legal standards [as a] part and parcel of their sovereignty, and 
are unwilling to surrender it to international control. National self-
interest stands in the way of a sensible regulation of this crucial area.  
As a consequence each State decides, on its own, how to make inter-
national law binding on State agencies and individuals and what 
status and rank to assign to it in the hierarchy of municipal sources 
of law. 
Id.; LOUIS HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 149, 153 (West 
Publishing Co. 1993)  
The international obligation is upon the state, not upon any particu-
lar branch, institution, or individual member of its govern-
ment….Since a state’s responsibility to give effect to international ob-
ligations does not fall upon any particular institution of its govern-
ment, international law does not require that domestic courts apply 
and give effect to international obligations. 
Id.; L. OPPENHEIM ET AL., OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (Sir Robert 
Jennings ed., 9th ed. Longman Group UK Lmtd. 1992) (“The obligation is the 
obligation of the state, and the failure of an organ of the state, such as a Par-
liament or a court, to give effect to the international obligations of the state 
cannot be invoked by it as a justification for failure to meet its international 
obligations.”); ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNNO SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES 
VÖLKERRECHT: THEORIE UND PRAXIS 539–40 (Duncker & Humblot eds., 1984) 
(“[International law] überträgt seine Durchführung den verpflichteten Staat-
ten, die es durch ihre Organen zur Anwendung zu bringen haben.…Bezweckt 
eine Völkerrechtsnorm Rechtswirkungen im innerstaatlichen Bereich, so muß 
ihr Inhalt in die innerstaatliche Rechtsordnung eingeführt (‘inkorporiert’) 
werden, um durch die staatlichen Organe erfüllt werden zu können.”  [“Inter-
national law delegates its effectuation to the obliged States, which are to exe-
cute it through their organs.…If a norm of international law has the purpose 
of taking legal effect within the State, its content must be introduced (incorpo-
rated) in the national legal order to enable State organs to comply with it.”]).  
See also IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31–56 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998) (“In principle decisions by organs of interna-
tional organizations are not binding on national courts without the co-
operation of the internal legal system.”). 
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tional law becomes binding on State organs from the moment of 
its conception in most, if not all, countries to result from a per-
missive rule of national law and not from the normative force of 
the customary law itself.32 
The acceptance of black-box theory permeates doctrine and 
practice, both national33 and international.34  It is evidenced ex-
  
 32. See CASSESE, supra note 31, at 172.  However, the fact that courts in a 
great many States apply customary international law without a corresponding 
provision in national law seems to argue for State organ obligation rather 
than black-box theory.  Indeed, the famous statements in The Paquete Ha-
bana and the history of the application of international law in the U.S. sup-
port that view.  See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 708 (1900).  In 
The Paquete Habana, the U.S. Supreme Court noted that: 
International law is part of [U.S.] law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as of-
ten as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for 
their determination.  For this purpose, where there is no treaty and 
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort 
must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations.…This 
rule of international law is one which prize courts administering the 
law of nations are bound to take judicial notice of, and to give effect 
to, in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their own gov-
ernment in relation to the matter. 
Id.  See also Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A 
Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 HARV. L. REV. 853, 863–885 
(Part II: “International Law in United States Law”). 
 33. See, e.g., McFadden, supra note 8, at 45 (“Black-box theory made an 
early appearance in American jurisprudence and has remained a common 
feature of judicial reasoning to this day.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Ballantyne, Davidson and McIntyre v. Canada, HRC Commu-
nications Nos. 359/1989 and 385/1989, views adopted on March 13, 1993, 47th 
Session (1993), cited in Higgins, The Concept, supra note 9, at 548.  In Ballan-
tyne, the applicants complained to the Human Rights Committee that a pro-
hibition by the province of Quebec to use the English language in advertising 
violated their rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (“ICCPR”).  While finding a violation of Article 19, the Committee did 
not find a violation of Article 27 (minority rights): 
As to Article 27, the Committee observes that this provision refers to 
minorities in States; this refers, as do all references to the “State” or 
to “States” in the provisions of the Covenant, to ratifying States….  
Accordingly, the minorities referred to in Article 27 are minorities 
within such a State, and not minorities within any province.  A group 
may constitute a majority in a province but still be a minority in a 
State and thus entitled to the benefits of Article 27.  English speak-
ing citizens of Canada cannot be considered a linguistic minority.  
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plicitly in treaty practice, for example, by federalism clauses 
that limit the obligations to the central State.35  Various treaties 
contain provisions that, similar to a federalism clause, assume a 
lack of obligation on the part of (certain) State organs.36  Like-
wise, many scholars consider that international law does not 
govern international agreements between State organs, such as 
those between states in a union or provinces.37  It is especially 
  
The authors therefore have no claim under Article 27 of the Cove-
nant.  
Id. at para. 11.2.  Thus, the Committee adopted a narrow reading of the word 
State in the ICCPR, which excludes their constituent parts, such as a province 
like Quebec.  Accordingly, the Committee called on Canada to remedy the 
violation of Article 19 “by an appropriate amendment of the law.”  Id. at para. 
13.  The Committee addressed Canada even though it was clear that such an 
amendment would have to be passed by the provincial government of Quebec. 
 35. See, e.g., Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage, Nov. 16, 1972, art. 34, 1037 U.N.T.S. 152, 161.  
 36. See, e.g., Draft Supplemental Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the European Police Office on the Exchange of Personal Data 
and Related Information, Nov. 4, 2002, art. 7, available at http://www.state 
watch.org/news/2002/nov/12eurosagmt.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).  In 
particular, Article 7 states:  
Authorities competent to receive information: 
(a) Information supplied by Europol under this Agreement shall 
be available to competent U.S. federal authorities for use in ac-
cordance with this Agreement.  
(b) Such information shall also be available for use by competent 
U.S. state or local authorities provided that they agree to observe 
the provisions of this Agreement, in particular Article 5, para-
graph 1. 
Id.  
 37. See Eyal Benvenisti, Domestic Politics and International Resources: 
What Role For International Law?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 109, 
126 (Michael Byers ed. 2000).  As Eyal Benvenisti explains: 
Current doctrine seems to suggest that [sub-State] agreements will 
not be governed by international law, but rather by one or a number 
of national laws.  This doctrine is derived from two principles: first, 
the principle of unity of action of the State at the international level; 
and second, the lack of legal personality of sub-State entities in the 
international sphere.  
Id.  However, a clear contrary practice exists in this regard.  Hong Kong, a 
special administrative region of the People’s Republic of China, participates in 
“more than forty international organizations and associations” and is party to 
hundreds of treaties, both bilateral and multilateral.  RODA MUSHKAT, ONE 
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telling that even initiatives for reform that aim at more effec-
tive adjudication of international law at the national level are 
often drafted presuming black-box theory.38  
Thus, we learn to see the State as a walled town.  Interna-
tional law can lay siege to the town from the outside, forcing the 
  
COUNTRY, TWO INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSONALITIES: THE CASE OF HONG KONG 
8–9 (Hong Kong University Press 1997).  See also Cheung v. United States, 
213 F.3d 82 (2d Cir. 2000) (finding that an extradition treaty with a sub-
sovereign like Hong-Kong is a valid treaty under the federal extradition stat-
ute).  The 1991 Mexican Law Regarding the Making of Treaties regulates so-
called “inter-institutional agreements” and defines them in Article 2 subsec-
tion II as: 
[A]n agreement governed by public international law, entered into in 
writing between any centralized or decentralized agency of the Fed-
eral, State or Municipal Public Administration and one or more for-
eign governmental agencies or international organizations, whatever 
its denomination, and without regard to whether or not it arises out 
of a previously approved treaty. Inter-institutional agreements must 
be strictly circumscribed by the scope of authority of the above-
mentioned agencies that may execute them on respective levels of 
government.  
CDLX Diaro Official de la Federacion 2 (Jan. 2, 1992) (Mex.).  The law also 
allows “Mexican legal entities” to participate in international dispute settle-
ment (Article 8), which seems to affirm the reading that “inter-institutional 
agreements are only binding upon those agencies which have entered into 
them, not upon the Federation.”  See Mexico: Law Regarding the Making of 
Treaties, Dec. 21, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 390 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1992) (intro-
ductory note by Antonio Garza Canovas).  See also Christian Tomuschat, In-
ternational Law: Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New Cen-
tury: General Course on Public International Law, 281 REC DES COURS (LA 
HAYE) 9, 114 (1999) [hereinafter Tomuschat, International Law] (“[T]he char-
acter of an instrument concluded by a constituent unit of a federal State as an 
instrument governed by international law should not be put into doubt.”); 
FEDERATED AND REGIONAL ENTITIES AND INTERNATIONAL TREATIES, REPORT 
ADOPTED BY THE VENICE COMMISSION, Dec. 10, 1999, CDL-INF (2000) 3, avail-
able at www.venice.coe.int/docs/2000/CDL-INF(2000)003-e.html (last visited 
Oct. 5, 2003) (seven out of the thirteen States responding to the global survey 
— Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Denmark, Germany 
and Switzerland — allow sub-State entities to conclude international treaties, 
generally including multilateral ones); Nicolas Schmitt, The Foreign Relations 
of Swiss Cantons, in FEDERALISM AND MULTIETHNIC STATES: THE CASE OF 
SWITZERLAND 131, 141 (Lidija R. Basta & Thomas Fleiner–Gerster eds., 1996).  
 38. See Resolution of the Institut de Droit International (1993 Milan) 
ANNUAIRE DE L’INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 65 art. 1, 321 (“National 
courts should be empowered by their domestic legal order to interpret and 
apply international law with full independence.”).  See also the 1988 Banga-
lore principles, supra note 9.  
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State to bring about certain results; however, it cannot control 
how these results will be accomplished or who will act within 
the walled town.  Even detailed international obligations that 
specify the means and organs through which desired results are 
to be achieved do not impose themselves directly on the desig-
nated organs, but rather oblige the State to put those specific 
organs to work.39  In the absence of such delegation to specific 
organs by the State, the “town walls” serve to blockade interna-
tional law’s reach.  
In order to fully comprehend the relevance of State organ ob-
ligation, it is necessary to clearly distinguish between interna-
tional obligations and related questions, such as the obligation’s 
rank in the national legal order and its international enforce-
ment through State responsibility.  Treating these questions as 
one all-encompassing topic obscures the fundamental impor-
tance of the obligation itself,40 even though it often seems logical 
to discuss legal obligation in conjunction with enforcement.  For 
example, one can argue that as long as the State remains the 
relevant unit for the ultimate enforcement of international obli-
gations, which takes place at the international level, the ques-
tion of whether State organs have parallel obligations to that of 
the State proves irrelevant.  What does it matter whether the 
Governor of Arizona has an international obligation if it is the 
U.S. that will appear before the ICJ in case of a breach?41  
Similarly, it is often assumed that the effect of international 
obligations on organs within a State is only relevant if the in-
  
 39. See Fitzmaurice, supra note 20, at 68–69 (“[W]hen it is said that inter-
national law in a number of ways prescribes what States must do or not do in 
their own territory, this does not mean that international law has, as such, 
direct and immediate application in State territory.”).  Cf. Lord Denning MR 
in Blackburn v. Attorney-General, 1 W.L.R. 1037 (C.A. 1971) (“Even if a 
treaty is signed, it is elementary that these courts take no notice of treaties as 
such.  We take no notice of treaties until they are embodied in laws enacted by 
Parliament, and then only to the extent that Parliament tells us.”). 
 40. Cf. Yoram Dinstein, The Implementation of International Human 
Rights, in RECHT ZWISCHEN UMBRUCH UND BEWAHRUNG: FESTSCHRIFT FÜR 
RUDOLF BERNHARDT [LAW BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND PRESERVATION: AN 
ANNIVERSARY PUBLICATION FOR RUDOLF BERHARDT] B.331, 334 (Ulrich Beyerlin 
ed., 1995) (“The enormity of the problem of the implementation of interna-
tional human rights must not detract from the importance of the threshold 
issue whether these human rights exist at all.”). 
 41. Part IV.B. of this Article will revisit the relationship between State 
organ obligation and State responsibility. 
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ternational norms can trump national law.  In fact, Professor 
John Rogers, in his analysis of U.S. case law, states that U.S. 
courts and judges do not apply public international law ipso 
facto,42 specifically noting that: 
In the statutory interpretation context, even [in] the most ex-
treme application of the Rule of Interpretation,…the court 
[has been] careful to state that the Congress [can] legislate in 
contravention of international treaty obligations of the [U.S.], 
if only the words of Congress were clear enough.…The univer-
sal assumption is thus incontrovertibly “dualist” in the sense 
that in [U.S.] courts, public international law is [U.S.] law only 
if something in [U.S.] law makes it so.43  
This analysis of international law’s application in the U.S. 
clearly steps too far.  The fact that congressional legislation can 
override treaty law in the U.S. is not an argument against the 
binding power of treaties on the courts under international law.  
It is merely a limitation of the practical effect of a treaty’s bind-
ingness.  After all, courts, as State organs, will generally follow 
the instructions of national law in resolving conflicts between 
national and international rules.  Lack of supremacy, neverthe-
less, fails to render the question of State organs’ international 
obligations as superfluous. 
Rather, a “sanctionist” perspective on international law de-
velops by connecting the question of obligation to enforcement 
or hierarchy.  Such an analysis concentrates the discussion on 
cases where international obligations are breached or conflict 
with national law (or both).  This type of analysis, however, only 
portrays a part of the story.  Often, States simply comply with 
international obligations, discarding the need for external en-
forcement.  Similarly, international obligations can be effective 
without directly confronting national law.44  In LaGrand, it was 
open to both the Governor of Arizona45 and the U.S. Supreme 
  
 42. JOHN M. ROGERS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND UNITED STATES LAW 73 (Dart-
mouth Pub. Co. Ltd. & Ashgate Pub. Co. 1999). 
 43. Id.   
 44. For example, when Courts apply and interpret national law in confor-
mity with international law.  See, e.g., infra note 321.   
 45. In fact, the U.S. acknowledged this point in the case’s final proceedings 
before the ICJ.  See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, para. 95.   
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Court,46 under national law, to grant a stay of the execution and, 
thus, ensure compliance with the Order of the ICJ.47  A suffi-
cient sense of obligation under international law might well 
have compelled them to do so.  
Some commentators mainly focus on the necessity of an in-
ternationalist attitude of State organs, discarding international 
law’s bindingness as a theoretical issue that is of little effect for 
everyday practice.48  Although the importance of State organs’ 
cooperative attitude is beyond doubt,49 a far-reaching relativiza-
tion of the bindingness of international obligations on State or-
gans is misplaced and counter-productive.  Certainly it is overly 
optimistic to first imprint lawyers during their education with 
the idea that international law has no place of its own within 
the State and then expect them to vigorously uphold (unincor-
porated) international obligations during the rest of their ca-
reers.  Relativizing the formal status of international obliga-
  
 46. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Court to Court, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 708, 711 
(1998).  
 47. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, para. 32.   
 48. See Roger P. Alford, Federal Courts, International Tribunals, and the 
Continuum of Deference, 43 VA. J. OF INT’L L. 675, 792 (2003) (“Rather than 
debate whether international tribunal decisions are binding or not, a far more 
fruitful inquiry is to consider the continuum of deference accorded to interna-
tional tribunals, with national courts granting varying degrees of respect de-
pending on the circumstances presented.”).  Cf., e.g., Conforti, Notes, supra 
note 9, at 18.  As Conforti asserts:  
[The position of international rules in the domestic legal order] is not 
a question of adopting a monistic rather than a dualistic approach.  
This is a theoretical question with no practical implications, which 
can be left in the hands of philosophers.  It is rather a question of a 
change in the mentality of people involved in legal affairs, especially 
legislators, public administrators and judges.  It is a question of per-
suading this people to use all means and mechanisms provided by 
municipal law, and to perfect them, in order to ensure compliance 
with international rules.  
Id. 
 49. See Higgins, The Concept, supra note 9, at 552 (“Pragmatism and a 
cultural disposition to comply with international obligations have led to ways 
being found for a state to secure compliance with such obligations even when, 
constitutionally, it seems that the state concerned lacks the necessary pow-
ers.”). 
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tions is not likely to convince nationalist skeptics that they 
should pay more attention to international law in practice.50  
Breaking away from the sanctionist perspective exposes the 
importance of the question of State organ obligation.  The bind-
ing nature of these obligations is an important factor in the in-
ternalization, and thus effectuation of the law.51  It can also be 
an effective argument in bringing public pressure on State or-
gans to comply with international obligations in concrete 
cases.52  
This question takes on further significance where the central 
government has no formal power to compel an organ to comply 
with international law, as may be the case with courts and 
states in a union.  A telling example is found in the 1972 judg-
ment of the European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”) in 
Tyrer v. United Kingdom.53  In this case, the ECHR held the 
United Kingdom in breach of Article 3 of the European Conven-
tion for the practice of judicial corporal punishment on the Isle 
of Man.54  Nevertheless, the Manx legislature refused to alter its 
law on judicial corporal punishment, and the United Kingdom’s 
government could neither compel nor persuade it.55  Eventually, 
a change in the Isle of Man High Court’s case law led to a vol-
  
 50. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 9, at 304–07.  Cf. Jochen A. 
Frowein, The Implementation and Promotion of International Law through 
National Courts, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AS A LANGUAGE FOR INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 85, 92–93 (United Nations Pub., 1996) [hereinafter Frowein, The 
Implementation] (“The slogan, ‘international law forms part of the law of the 
land,’ first used by British judges very early on, has certainly had an enor-
mous impact on the general attitude of lawyers in the countries which have 
adopted the rule.”).  
 51. See generally Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International 
Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997). 
 52. State organs, when breaching international law, regularly deny the 
binding force of the obligation, thereby recognizing it as a relevant factor.  See, 
e.g., LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, at para. 33 (referring to the behavior of various 
U.S. organs); Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
(Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 258 (Request for the Indication of Provisional 
Measures) (Apr. 9) [hereinafter Breard] (involving issues similar to LaGrand, 
the execution of a foreign national in the U.S. despite provisional measures of 
the I.C.J.); infra Part III.A.1.    
 53. Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (ser. A) (1978), cited, along 
with similar cases, in Higgins, The Concept, supra note 9, at 550.  
 54. Id. at para. 39.  
 55. Id. at paras. 13–15. 
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untary abrogation of the practice of corporal punishment.56  In a 
case like this, it is crucial that the State organ recognizes the 
international obligation, as the Isle of Man Court did when the 
legislature would not.  Otherwise, the State would need to 
change either its internal structure or its international obliga-
tions.  This Article will revisit the practical effects of State or-
gan obligation in more detail in Part IV.B. 
Finally, the oft-debated question of the self-executing charac-
ter of treaty provisions requires some comment at the outset.  
Limiting the domestic validity of treaties to those that are self-
executing is essentially an avoidance doctrine under national 
law, allowing the courts to ignore certain international norms.57  
Some treaty provisions are surely imprecise or incomplete, but 
no rule of international law requires States to exclude these 
provisions from their national legal order altogether.  Courts 
can very well apply all treaty provisions, and hold that non-self-
executing provisions are domestically valid law, but too impre-
cise or incomplete to govern a specific case.58  
Therefore, the mere fact that a treaty provision is labeled as a 
non-self-executing obligation under national law will in princi-
ple not prevent it from placing an international duty on State 
organs.  At best, it may be indicative of a lack of precision or 
completeness, which precludes the provision from imposing 
such a duty.  On the other hand, as may be inferred from our 
discussion of hierarchy above, a national rule prohibiting the 
application of non-self-executing provisions may well prevent 
courts from giving effect to their international obligations.59  In 
this regard, the matter of self-execution is no different than any 
other avoidance doctrine in national law, such as the “political 
question” doctrine, the act of state doctrine or restrictions on 
the standing of individuals. 
  
 56. See Higgins, The Concept, supra note 9, at 550. 
 57. The existence of declarations on the non-self-executing character of 
entire treaties and the fact that international judges and arbitrators regularly 
apply provisions that national courts deem non-self-executing evidence the 
national origin of the non-self-executing label.  
 58. See Danilenko, supra note 9, at 65 (stating that the Russian Constitu-
tional Court does not distinguish between self-executing and non-self-
executing treaties). 
 59. Obviously, this problem will lead to a breach of the international obli-
gation. 
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III. DIVERGING PRACTICE: DECLINE OF BLACK-BOX THEORY? 
Now that we have outlined the black-box theory and its ac-
ceptance in practice, we turn to the case law that challenges the 
view that State organs have no international obligations unless 
they are imposed by domestic law.  This section starts with an 
inquiry of the ICJ and then proceeds to examine the practice of 
other international bodies.   
A. The International Court of Justice 
Because international law predominantly focuses on States as 
the relevant units, international courts are generally set-up to 
deal with States as unitary entities and not with their specific 
organs.60  The principal function of the ICJ, like its predecessor, 
the Permanent Court of Justice, is to resolve disputes between 
States.61  The obligation to comply with ICJ judgments is placed 
upon the parties participating in the proceedings.62  While it is 
clear that this obligation binds the State as an entity, there is 
no consensus as to whether it obligates State organs.63  Profes-
sor Shabtai Rosenne states that it “follows from the fact that 
the decision is binding upon the State as such that it is binding 
upon all the organs of the State.”64  Others believe that the obli-
gation to comply is incumbent only upon the State as an entity, 
and that its organs “are not directly obliged by virtue of the 
judgment unless a direct obligation is provided for in the consti-
tutional law of the State concerned.”65  
  
 60. Several courts now allow for the participation of individuals in addition 
to States.  Partly as a consequence of this development, Courts, especially in 
Europe, have been able to force a direct relationship with State organs, al-
though participation of State organs was not envisaged in the legal framework 
of these courts. 
 61. PHILLIPPE SANDS & PIERRE KLEIN, BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS 338 (5th ed. 2001).  
 62. See U.N. CHARTER art. 94, para. 1; I.C.J. STAT. Art. 59 (June 26, 1945), 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/basetext /istatute. 
htm#TOC (last visited Oct. 6, 2003).  
 63. See Sarita Ordóñez & David M. Reilly, Effect of the Jurisprudence of 
the International Court of Justice on National Courts, in DECISIONS, supra 
note 9, at 335. 
 64. SHABTAI ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
COURT, 1920–1996, 221 (1997). 
 65. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS, A COMMENTARY 1176 (Bruno 
Simma ed. 2002).  See generally Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Reception by Na-
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The question of State organ compliance also remains unre-
solved in practice.  The duty of specific State organs to comply 
with ICJ judgments has received little treatment, and, in the 
U.S., generally negative treatment.66  The Court itself has sel-
dom, if ever, commented specifically on the position and obliga-
tions of State organs.  Recently, however, that situation has 
changed. 
1. LaGrand 
In order to fully understand the proceedings before the ICJ in 
LaGrand, it is necessary to examine the case’s background.67  In 
the U.S., Arizona prosecuted and sentenced to death two Ger-
man nationals, the brothers Karl and Walter LaGrand, without 
notifying them of their right to consular assistance under the 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.68  In recent years, 
the U.S. has persistently violated this duty of notice.69  This pat-
tern of violations has drawn protests from several countries, 
especially in death penalty cases, and resulted in the issuance 
of an Advisory Opinion by the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights.70  
Shortly before LaGrand, the ICJ ordered provisional meas-
ures against the U.S. at the request of Paraguay in the case of 
Angel Breard, who had been sentenced to death in Virginia 
without receiving the notification required under the Vienna 
Convention.71  The Order required the U.S. to “take all meas-
  
tional Courts of Decisions of International Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 45 (1997).  
 66. See Douglas Cassel, Judicial Remedies, supra note 10, at 854, 887.  See 
also supra note 53. 
 67. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, at paras. 13–34; Symposium, Reflections 
on the ICJ’s LaGrand Decision, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 423–52 (2002); Robert 
Jennings, The LaGrand Case, in 1 THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 13 (2002). 
 68. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 36, 21 
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261.  
 69. See Anthony N. Bishop, The Unenforceable Rights To Consular Notifi-
cation and Access in the United States: What’s Changed Since the LaGrand 
Case?, 25 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2002). 
 70. The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of 
the Guarantees of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R., (ser. A) No. 16 (Oct. 1, 1999).    
 71. See Breard, 1998 I.C.J. at 258 (para. 41).  
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ures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco Breard 
[would] not [be] executed pending the final decision” of the 
Court.72  While this Order addressed the U.S. without any fur-
ther specification, in a separate opinion, the Court’s President 
recognized “the serious difficulties which [the order imposed] on 
the authorities of the [U.S.] and Virginia.”73  As in all prior cases 
similar to Breard, the U.S. insisted that an apology to the coun-
try of nationality was an appropriate and sufficient remedy for 
its violation of the Vienna Convention.  As a result, Virginia 
carried out the execution as planned on April 14, 1998.  In the 
process leading up to the execution, various U.S. organs explic-
itly recognized the ICJ’s Order, but justified their decision not 
to adhere to it by referring to its alleged lack of binding power, 
either for the U.S. generally or for them specifically.74  Paraguay 
initially indicated that it would pursue its case against the U.S. 
before the ICJ after the execution, but later revoked its applica-
tion. 
Less than a year after Breard’s execution and just weeks af-
ter Karl LaGrand’s execution, the ICJ issued provisional meas-
ures at the request of Germany to stop the execution of Walter 
LaGrand.75  The U.S. position in Breard obviously influenced 
the ICJ’s handling of the LaGrand case, as is reflected in the 
Court’s issuance of provisional measures.  In fact, Germany had 
asked the Court for no more than an Order that was identical to 
the Court’s Order in Breard, requiring the U.S. to take all 
  
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. at 259 (separate declaration of President Schwebel).  
 74. See Curtis A. Bradley, Breard, Our Dualist Constitution, and the Inter-
nationalist Conception, 51 STAN. L. REV. 529, 561–65 (1999); Jonathan I. 
Charney & William Michael Reisman, Agora: Breard. The Facts, 92 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 666, 672–73 (1998).  The Justice and State Departments interpreted 
Breard as follows:   
[E]ven if parties to a case before the ICJ are required to heed an or-
der of that court indicating provisional measures, the ICJ’s order in 
this case does not require this Court to stop Breard’s execution. That 
order states that the United States “should” take all measures “at its 
disposal” to ensure that Breard is not executed….[T]he “measures at 
[the Government’s] disposal” are a matter of domestic United States 
law.   
Id. (citing to an amicus brief by those departments to the Supreme Court).  
 75. LaGrand Case (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. 9, 10 (March 1999) (Request 
for the Indication of Provisional Measures). 
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measures at its disposal to prevent the upcoming execution.76  
The Court, however, went further and issued an Order with the 
following provisional measures:  
(a) The United States of America should take all measures at 
its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed 
pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should in-
form the Court of all the measures which it has taken in im-
plementation of this order; 
(b) The Government of the United States of America should 
transmit this Order to the Governor of the State of Arizona.77 
Section (a) of the Order follows the same pattern as the 
Court’s Order in Breard, as Germany had requested.  The spe-
cific order in section (b), however, added sua sponte, reflects the 
ICJ’s lack of success in the Breard case.  The meaning of the 
operative paragraph is somewhat facially ambiguous.  It is not 
immediately clear whether the Court intends to directly obli-
gate the Governor of Arizona, or if it wishes to only oblige the 
U.S. government to inform the Governor of the Order without 
attaching a corresponding obligation.  Yet, the former interpre-
tation seems the only plausible one when read in conjunction 
with the Order’s preceding comments in paragraph 28, where 
the Court spells out the Governor’s obligation: 
Whereas the international responsibility of a State is engaged 
by the action of the competent organs and authorities acting in 
that State, whatever they may be; whereas the United States 
should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter 
LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these 
proceedings; whereas, according to the information available 
to the Court, implementation of the measures indicated in the 
present Order falls within the jurisdiction of the Governor of 
Arizona; whereas the Government of the United States is con-
sequently under the obligation to transmit the present Order 
to the said Governor; whereas the Governor of Arizona is under 
  
 76. Judge Buergenthal considered Germany’s request for an Order identi-
cal to Breard to be a breach of Germany’s obligation of elementary fairness 
toward the U.S. because Germany had acted with the knowledge that the U.S. 
interpreted Breard as non-binding.  See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104 (dissenting 
opinion Judge Buergenthal).  
 77. LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 10.   
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the obligation to act in conformity with the international un-
dertakings of the United States….78  
As it is highly unlikely that the Court would pronounce on 
the Governor of Arizona’s obligations under the U.S. laws, espe-
cially without further elaboration, it seems the Governor’s obli-
gation to act in conformity with the U.S.’ international under-
takings must be one under international law.  That the Court 
addressed the U.S. government and not the Governor directly 
can be explained as a procedural matter, stemming from the 
federal government’s position as the legal representative of the 
State and its organs.79 
Nevertheless, as in Breard, U.S. officials disregarded the 
Court’s provisional measures. Arizona carried out the second 
execution as planned on March 3, 1999, the same day the ICJ 
issued its Order.  Germany pursued the case, and on June 27, 
2001, the ICJ delivered its final judgment.80  Although again in 
ambiguous language, the Court’s ruling seems to support the 
view that the Governor was bound by the U.S.’ obligation to 
“take all measures at its disposal.”81  After the Court deter-
mined, for the first time, that provisional measures indeed do 
create legal obligations,82 the Court reviewed whether the U.S. 
had complied with its obligations under the March 3, 1999 Or-
der.  No dispute arose over the second provisional measure, as 
the U.S. government had transmitted the Order to Arizona’s 
Governor.83  Instead, the question was whether the U.S. had 
taken “all measures at its disposal” to prevent the execution, as 
the first provisional measure required.  
The U.S. argued that it had done all it could by transmitting 
the Order to Arizona’s Governor and informing the ICJ of this 
action.  Due to the extraordinary short time between the 
Court’s Order and the execution, as well as the U.S.’ legal char-
acter as a “federal republic of divided powers,” the U.S. alleged 
  
 78. Id. at 16 (para. 28) (emphasis added). 
 79. Cf. I.C.J. STAT. art. 44(1) (“For the service of all notices upon persons 
other than the agents, counsel, and advocates, the Court shall apply direct to 
the government of the state upon whose territory the notice has to be 
served.”). 
 80. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, at paras. 109–10.  
 81. Id. at para. 32.  
 82. Id. at paras. 109–10. 
 83. Id. at para. 111. 
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that no other steps were possible.84  The U.S. took the classic 
black-box position, interpreting the Court’s order as binding on 
the State entity, the federal government, but not on the various 
U.S. organs involved in the case.  Because of complex separa-
tion of powers issues and a lack of time, the State was unable to 
“translate” its obligation to the relevant State organs in this 
case. 
The Court had a different perspective.  It specifically de-
scribed the steps that various U.S. organs took in the case.  The 
Court explicitly noted that both the Governor of Arizona and 
the U.S. Supreme Court had declined to use their authority to 
grant a stay of execution,85 and then concluded: 
The review of the above steps taken by the authorities of the 
United States with regard to the Order of the International 
Court of Justice of 3 March 1999 indicates that the various 
competent United States authorities failed to take all the 
steps they could have taken to give effect to the Court’s Order.  
The Order did not require the United States to exercise pow-
ers it did not have; but it did impose the obligation to “take all 
measures at its disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not 
executed pending the final decision in these proceedings….”  
The Court finds that the United States did not discharge this 
obligation.86   
Thus, it seems that the Court considered both the Governor 
and the U.S. Supreme Court to be bound by the U.S. interna-
tional obligations in this case.87  Otherwise, the Court would not 
have analyzed their conduct regarding U.S. compliance with its 
obligation to “take all measures at its disposal.”88  Instead, the 
  
 84. Id. at para.  95. 
 85. Id. at paras. 113–14. 
 86. Id. at para. 115. 
 87. Compare Higgins, The Concept, supra note 9, at 555 (commenting on 
the identical order in Breard: “The relevant powers were dispersed both 
within the federal structures and between federal institutions and the State of 
Virginia. Hence it was for ‘the United States’ to take ‘all measures at its dis-
posal.’”) with Jochen A. Frowein, Provisional Measures by the International 
Court of Justice — The LaGrand Case, 62 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES 
OFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT [JOURNAL OF FOREIGN PUBLIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW] 55, 59 (2002) (“This part of the judgment is difficult to 
read without implying that the United States is limited to the Federal Gov-
ernment, and the Federal Government has limited powers.”).  
 88. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, at para. 32. 
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Court would have focused entirely on the question of whether 
time had prevented the U.S. government from taking additional 
measures.   
2. Cumaraswamy 
Less than two months after ordering provisional measures in 
LaGrand, on April 29, 1999, the ICJ issued an Advisory Opin-
ion in a dispute between the United Nations (“UN”) and Malay-
sia regarding the immunity of the UN’s Special Rapporteur on 
the Independence of Judges and Lawyers in the Malaysian 
Courts’ civil proceedings.89  Several Malaysian companies had 
sued the Rapporteur, Mr. Cumaraswamy, due to certain alleg-
edly defamatory comments that he had made in a magazine 
interview.90  Despite multiple interventions by the UN Secre-
tary-General, the Malaysian courts had refused in several in-
stances to grant Mr. Cumaraswamy immunity from legal proc-
ess pursuant to Article VI section 22(b) of the Convention on the 
Privileges and Immunities of the UN.91  The UN Economic and 
Social Council then requested an Advisory Opinion from the 
Court pursuant to Article 30 of the Convention, in accordance 
with Article 96 of the UN Charter and Article 65 of the ICJ 
Statute.  The Council asked the Court to determine, in short: (1) 
whether Mr. Cumaraswamy enjoyed immunity under the cir-
cumstances described; and (2) Malaysia’s legal obligations in 
this case.92 
In its opinion, the ICJ let no doubt exist about its position re-
garding State organs.  It found inter alia: 
(1)(a)….That the Government of Malaysia had the obligation 
to inform the Malaysian courts of the finding of the Secretary-
General that Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy was entitled to im-
munity from legal process;… 
  
 89. See Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.C.J. 62, at para. 43 (April 29).  See also Ha-
zel Fox, The Advisory Opinion on the Difference Relating to Immunity From 
Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the Commission of Human Rights: 
Who Has the Last Word on Judicial Independence?, 12 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 
889, 911 (1999).  
 90. See Dato’ Para Cumaraswamy v. MBF Capital BHD & Anor (Court of 
Appeal, Kuala Lumpur 1997) 3 MLJ 824. 
 91. See id. at 837.  
 92. Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.C.J. at 78, 81 (paras. 31, 36–37).  
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…. 
(2)(a)….That the Malaysian courts had the obligation to deal 
with the question of immunity from legal process as a prelimi-
nary issue to be expeditiously decided in limine litis;… 
…. 
(4) That the Government of Malaysia had the obligation to 
communicate this advisory opinion to the Malaysian courts, in 
order that Malaysia’s international obligations be given effect 
and Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy’s immunity be respected….93  
Thus, the Court unambiguously held that the obligations un-
der the Convention were not only those of the State of Malaysia, 
but also of the State organs involved, namely the Malaysian 
Courts. 
The only Judge to vote against these three paragraphs was 
Judge Koroma.94  He did not categorically rule out State organs’ 
international obligations, but he also could not derive such an 
obligation from the particular facts of the case.95  Judge Oda 
joined Judge Koroma in his dissent on the Malaysian govern-
ment’s obligations.  Judge Oda wholeheartedly embraced the 
finding of an obligation of the Malaysian courts,96 but deemed 
the findings on the government’s obligations unwarranted.97  
The Malaysian High Court subsequently decided that the 
ICJ’s Advisory Opinion had to be respected in this case, treating 
Malaysia’s international obligations as decisive for the out-
come.98  The High Court emphasized that international obliga-
tions voluntarily undertaken cannot easily be ignored.99  It con-
  
 93. Id. at 89 (para. 67). 
 94. Id. at 111 (para. 1 of Judge Koroma’s separate opinion). 
 95. See id. at 121 (para. 28). 
 96. Id. at 106 (para. 20) (separate opinion of Judge Oda).   
 97. Id. at 107 (paras. 23–26). 
 98. Insas Bhd and Another v. Dato’ Param Cumaraswamy, 7 July 2000, 
reprinted in 121 I.L.R. 464–471 (2002).  See Sujantani Poosparajah, Param is 
Immune, Rules High Court, NEW STRAITS TIMES, July 8, 2000, at 2, available 
at 2000 WL 22839864.    
 99. Cumaraswamy, 121 I.L.R. at 468, 470.  The Court explained: 
Whilst the Malaysian courts including the Appellate Court had de-
cided that the issue of immunity as claimed by the defendant was a 
matter to be decided by this court during the course of the trial, the 
Government of Malaysia and the United Nations by consent agreed to 
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sidered itself bound by the ICJ’s interpretation in this case, em-
phasizing that the judiciary is “one of the three organs that en-
sures good governance.”100  The decision’s language clearly dis-
plays the idea that State organs have the duty to respect the 
international obligations of their State, regardless of the “trans-
lation” of those obligations into national law.  
Overall, the ICJ clearly embraced the concept of State organ 
obligation in this case, in more explicit terms than in LaGrand.  
Both cases, however, squarely contradict the black-box theory.  
3. Analysis: New Substance or New Formulation? 
At this point, an important question arises — how do we read 
these recent ICJ cases?  Does the Court’s discussion of State 
organs constitute a radical break in its jurisprudence, abandon-
ing the black-box theory for a model of State penetration?  Are 
these cases truly exceptions that are simply not representative 
  
refer this question of Param’s immunity for an advisory opinion to 
the [ICJ]…. 
…. 
Whilst the Malaysian courts had made a decision (in the Appeal 
Court) binding on its citizens, the Malaysian Government had volun-
tarily acceded to be bound by the advisory opinion of the ICJ…. 
…. 
It is also a fact that both the United Nations and Malaysia had 
agreed to accept the opinion given by the ICJ  “as decisive by the par-
ties.”  This is a serious consequence which parties had willingly en-
tered into and it is therefore a matter of grave concern for this court 
to be called upon to rule otherwise.   
Id.  
 100. Id. at 471.  The Court also noted: 
It is clear therefore that whilst the judiciary being one of the three 
organs that ensures good governance, had agreed to stay execution on 
its own order by awaiting the advisory opinion, it must have been 
moved to do so because of the voluntariness of the executive in agree-
ing to abide by the decision of the ICJ in respect of the defendant’s 
immunity…. 
…. 
[The Court is] bound to give binding effect to the advisory opinion in 
this case. 
Id.   
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of the Court’s case law?  Or is there nothing substantially new 
in these cases?  Does the Court only explicitly express in these 
cases what its earlier judgments silently assumed all along: 
that obligations of the State are obligations of its organs?  
Judging by the text of these decisions, one could think that 
the last view proves more plausible.  In the numerous separate 
and dissenting opinions of both LaGrand and Cumaraswamy, 
many of the Judges explicitly discuss and endorse State organ 
obligations without feeling the need for elaborate justifications.  
None of the Judges take issue with the concept of State organ 
obligation, not even the dissenters.  More importantly, none of 
the Judges treat the discussion of State organs as a novelty. 
That the ICJ detailed the obligations of State organs in La-
Grand and Cumaraswamy, whereas it normally goes to lengths 
to refrain from any interference with the internal organization 
of the States involved, could be explained by the particular cir-
cumstances of these cases.  In both instances, there were clear 
indications that the States involved (and their organs) would 
use any room left by the Court’s judgment to avoid giving effect 
to the Court’s ruling.  In LaGrand, the Court remembered the 
recent unwillingness of the different U.S. actors in Breard to 
give effect to its Order.  Moreover, the U.S. was a repeat of-
fender where it concerned consular aid to foreign prisoners.  In 
Cumaraswamy, the different Malaysian courts’ decisions 
showed a decided lack of interest for the UN Secretary-
General’s opinion, creating the very dispute in question.101  It 
was not immediately clear that the national courts would treat 
the ICJ’s judgment as more authoritative or as just another in-
ternational communication that did not need to be obeyed.  
Thus, in both cases, the Court might have felt compelled to 
spell out what it otherwise would have left implicit, for fear of a 
lack of good faith interpretation of the judgment by the parties 
involved.102  This interpretation finds some support in a com-
  
 101. See Cumaraswamy, 1999 I.C.J. 62.  
 102. Cf. Higgins, The Concept, supra note 9, at 556.  Higgins elaborates:  
Nor had the Court been unaware of the events within the United 
States that had followed its provisional measures in the Breard case.  
Accordingly, it decided to use some new language, in the attempt to 
speak across the miles directly to more of those relevant elements 
comprising “the state” which was the ratifying party under the Vi-
enna Convention, and over which the Court thus had jurisdiction.      
 
File: Ferdinandussemacro.doc Created on: 10/19/2003 7:57 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:54 PM 
2003] OUT OF THE BLACK-BOX 75 
parison with the ICJ’s later case law.  In the Case Concerning 
the Arrest Warrant of April 11, 2000, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v. Belgium,103 the Court again gave judgment in more 
familiar terms.  It found that the arrest warrant’s issue and 
circulation against the Congolese Minister of Foreign Affairs 
“constituted violations of a legal obligation of the Kingdom of 
Belgium,” and “that the Kingdom of Belgium must, by means of 
its own choosing, cancel the arrest warrant of [April 11, 2000] 
and so inform the authorities to whom that warrant was circu-
lated.”104 
Like Cumaraswamy, this case involved the violation of im-
munity under international law by national courts.105  A Belgian 
magistrate issued the disputed arrest warrant.106  Similar to the 
Court’s treatment of the issues in Cumaraswamy, the ICJ could 
have addressed the obligations of Belgian judicial organs di-
rectly, as it had already identified the relevant actors.  One 
cannot explain the difference in the Court’s approach in the two 
cases by comparing the complaining parties’ litigation strate-
gies, because both the United Nations Economic and Social 
Council (“ECOSOC”) (in Cumaraswamy) and Congo only ad-
dressed the obligations of the State and not specific State or-
gans.107  The fact that the Court on its own initiative discussed 
State organs in LaGrand and Cumaraswamy while it addressed 
the similar case of Congo v. Belgium only in very general terms, 
might have been prompted by the fact that unlike the U.S. and 
Malaysia in the first two cases, Belgium had displayed no ten-
dency whatsoever to disregard international law.  Accordingly, 
these three cases could be seen as consistent rather than in-
compatible, differing primarily in their degree of explicitness.  
A more realistic view, on the other hand, may be that the ICJ 
has taken two particularly amenable cases to introduce the un-
  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 103. Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 121, at paras. 18, 43, 59 (Feb. 
14), reprinted in 41 I.L.M 536, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idoc 
ket/iCOBE/icobejudg ment /icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF (last visited Sept. 
9, 2003). 
 104. Id. at paras. 75–78.  
 105. Id. at para. 1. 
 106. Id. at para. 13. 
 107. Id. at paras. 11, 13. 
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precedented concept of State organ obligation in the Court’s 
case law, and thereby took a conscious new step to strengthen 
international law.  Both cases involved fields of law where the 
black-box theory is historically least accepted — consular law 
and immunity from legal process.  Both cases also involved hu-
man rights concerns, the field of law where there is the strong-
est challenge to black-box theory.108  Moreover, in both cases, the 
violating State enjoyed little to no sympathy from the interna-
tional community, and there was considerable support for a 
strong affirmation of the obligations involved.109  These factors 
minimized the risk of broad opposition to the Court’s judgments 
and made LaGrand and Cumaraswamy suitable testing-
grounds for a shift in the ICJ’s case law and a more forceful 
reading of international obligations. 
Finally, a traditional view would be that the circumstances 
described here led the Court to overstep its authority and that 
these cases are mere exceptions that do not represent the 
Court’s jurisprudence.  However, the ICJ’s reasoning in La-
Grand and Cumaraswamy is rather determined and too explicit 
to be merely incidental.  Moreover, the Court’s rulings in these 
cases are in line with similar developments in other courts, 
which this Article will further elaborate.   But before doing so, 
the next section turns to a pending case before the ICJ that may 
very well prove to be the next step in “piercing the State veil.”   
  
 108. See JO PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-
AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 327 (2003) [hereinafter PASQUALUCCI]; 
NIHAL JAYAWICKRAMA, THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: 
NATIONAL, REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE 96–97 (2002).  Jay-
awickrama asserts that: 
The international law of human rights is substantially different from 
traditional international law.…The fact that it is the executive 
branch of government that represents the state in accepting obliga-
tions under the [human rights] treaty, does not exempt the legislative 
and judicial branches from performing those obligations.  It can 
hardly be argued that the legislature and the judiciary of a state 
party to a human rights treaty are free to ignore or decide not to give 
effect to, its provisions.  The commitment is made by ‘the state,’ 
which, in this context, must mean all three branches of government. 
Id. 
 109. See Cassel, Judicial Remedies, supra note 10, at 853, 862–63, 874–75.   
File: Ferdinandussemacro.doc Created on: 10/19/2003 7:57 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:54 PM 
2003] OUT OF THE BLACK-BOX 77 
4. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals: The Next Step? 
The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations did not stay off 
the ICJ docket for long.  While the U.S. federal government had 
started an extensive program to improve compliance with the 
Convention prior to LaGrand, many contest the effects of that 
program.  Moreover, the review of Convention violations has 
generally been limited to consideration in the clemency process 
both in existing and new cases.  U.S. courts have continued to 
deny remedies for these violations.110  Criticism of the U.S.’ lim-
ited response to LaGrand has been broad and sharp.111 
On January 9, 2003, Mexico was, after Paraguay and Ger-
many, the third country in five years to institute proceedings 
against the U.S. before the ICJ for alleged violations of the Vi-
enna Convention on Consular Relations.112  Mexico’s submission 
concerns the cases of Carlos Avena and fifty-three other Mexi-
can nationals on death-row in the U.S.113  Drawing heavily on 
Breard and LaGrand and raising similar questions, the Avena 
case will likely bring the question of State organ obligation back 
to the ICJ.  Mexico asked the Court to declare, inter alia: 
That the United States is under an international legal obliga-
tion to carry out in conformity with the foregoing international 
legal obligations any future detention of or criminal proceed-
ings against the 54 Mexican nationals on death row or any 
other Mexican national in its territory, whether by a constitu-
ent, legislative, executive, judicial or other power, whether 
that power holds a superior or a subordinate position in the 
organization of the United States, and whether that power’s 
functions are international or internal in character….114  
Mexico also requested the Court to indicate provisional meas-
ures to prevent all executions while the case was pending.  Re-
ferring to the U.S. record on this subject, Mexico asked for a 
  
 110. See Douglas Cassel, International Remedies in National Criminal 
Cases: ICJ Judgment in Germany v. United States, 15 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 69, 
79 (2002). 
 111. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, The Unreality of International Law in the 
United States and the LaGrand Case, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 427 (2002). 
 112. Avena, 2003 I.C.J. 128.  
 113. Id. at para. 1.  
 114. Id. at para. 281.   
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swift and forceful order.115  The application requested the Court 
to indicate inter alia that the U.S. government “take all meas-
ures necessary to ensure that no Mexican national be executed” 
pending final judgment.116 
The requested phrase “all measures necessary” would be a 
significant departure from the Orders in Breard and LaGrand, 
both of which required the U.S. to take “all measures at its dis-
posal.”117  Moreover, the Court had itself formulated the less 
demanding language in the Beard case,118 while Paraguay had 
made an identical request for an indication of “all measures 
necessary.”119 Opposing the requested departure from the 
Court’s earlier, more lenient orders, the U.S. vigorously con-
tested Mexico’s application.  The U.S. noted that: “the relation-
ship between the [U.S.] federal government and its states is one 
of great sensitivity, marked by the deference to the states in 
certain areas, including the administration of criminal law.”120  
In addition, the U.S. stated that Mexico’s request entailed an 
obligation directly implicating the federal relationship, which 
deviated from the Court’s holdings in Breard and LaGrand, as 
Mexico’s request tested the “limit of federal authority.”121  Thus, 
the U.S. implied that U.S. federal authorities could not execute 
Mexico’s provisional measures, while the constituent states that 
could execute them were not concerned by the proceedings be-
fore the ICJ.122  
The Court was not convinced by these objections.  On Febru-
ary 5, 2003, the ICJ indicated provisional measures against the 
U.S. even broader than those Mexico had requested.  While its 
  
 115. See Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. 
Order No. 128, para. 14 (Feb. 5) [hereinafter Avena, Order]; Avena and other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2003 I.C.J. Verbatim Record 2003/1 No. 
128, para. 141 (Jan. 21) [hereinafter Avena, Verbatim].  
 116. Avena, Order, supra note 115, at para. 18(a).   
 117. Cf. Note: Too Sovereign But Not Sovereign Enough: Are U.S. States 
Beyond The Reach of The Law of Nations?,  116 HARV. L. REV. 2654, 2671 
(2003) (arguing that the difference in language “bespeaks a court emboldened 
by its own prior holding that its provisional measures are binding.”). 
 118. Breard, 1998 I.C.J. at 258 (para. 41).  
 119. Id. at 251–52 (para. 9).  
 120. Avena, Verbatim, supra note 115, at para. 3.43. 
 121. Id. at para. 3.44.  
 122. See Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain the Treaty Power?, 
103 COLUM. L. REV. 403, 432 (2003).  Cf. Bradley, supra note 74, at 562.     
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applicability is limited to only three of the more than fifty cases, 
the Order puts stringent demands on U.S. authorities.  The 
Court unanimously123 indicated that: 
a) The United States of America shall take all measures nec-
essary to ensure that Mr. César Roberto Fierro Reyna, Mr. Ro- 
berto Moreno Ramos and Mr. Osvaldo Torres Aguilera are not 
executed pending final judgment in these proceedings; 
b) The Government of the United States of America shall in-
form the Court of all measures taken in implementation of 
this Order.124 
The Court not only adopted Mexico’s formulation of “all 
means necessary,”125 but also addressed the obligation to take 
those measures not just to the U.S. government, as Mexico had 
requested, but to the U.S. as a whole.126  At first glance, it seems 
a classic black-box formulation to address the State rather than 
the government.  However, it could well prove to be more intru-
sive if this formulation is interpreted to address not only fed-
eral, but also state authorities.  The Court’s choice of wording 
leaves open the possibility that all U.S. organs involved in these 
types of cases, including governors and courts, are under the 
obligation to prevent the executions.  This conclusion forms the 
logical consequence of applying the Court’s reasoning in La-
Grand to this Order (i.e., that U.S. authorities such as gover-
nors are “under the obligation to act in conformity with the in-
ternational undertakings” of the U.S.).127  The Court also men-
tioned Mexico’s submission that “[a]s a matter of international 
  
 123. Judge Oda, however, appended a declaration, which is in effect a dis-
senting opinion.  The consular relations cases apparently brought out an irre-
sistible urge in Judge Oda to vote out of humanitarian concerns in favour of 
Orders which he found legally unsound, while simultaneously pointing out the 
perceived errors in those Orders in dissenting opinions disguised as declara-
tions.  See Avena, 2003 I.C.J. 128, Declaration of Judge Oda, (Feb. 5) (stating 
that there is no dispute to be adjudicated); LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 18 (Judge 
Oda explained: “I voted in favour of the Court’s Order with great hesitation as 
I considered that the request for indication of provision measures of protection 
submitted by Germany to the Court should have been dismissed.”); Breard, 
1998 I.C.J. at 260 (Judge Oda’s statement was almost identical to his state-
ment in LaGrand).    
 124. Avena, Order, supra note 115, at paras. 59(I)(a–b). 
 125. Avena, Verbatim, supra note 115, at para. 3.44.  
 126. Avena, Order, supra note 115, at para. 59(I)(a).  
 127. LaGrand, 1999 I.C.J. at 16 (para. 28). 
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law, both the [U.S.] and its constituent political subdivisions 
have an obligation to abide by the international legal obliga-
tions of the [U.S.],” but did not comment on it.128   
As it seems unlikely that the U.S. will radically change its 
course in this matter, considerable chances exist that the final 
judgment in Avena will bring more clarity to the exact scope of 
the ICJ’s Order.129  In an initial reaction, the Governor of Texas 
already indicated that orders from American courts are the only 
ones Texas will follow, as “according to [his] reading of the law 
and the treaty,…no authority [exists] for the [U.S.] federal gov-
ernment or th[e] World Court to prohibit Texas from exercising 
the laws passed by [its] legislature.”130     
B. Other International Courts 
The ICJ is not alone in its efforts to speak directly to relevant 
actors within the State.  In fact, it is only taking the first cau-
tious steps on a path where other international courts have 
made considerable progress.  The most prominent example is 
the law of the European Community.  Even if the different em-
beddings and political realities of the various international 
courts do not allow for easy predictions by comparison, it is cer-
tainly illuminating to see how other international courts have 
pierced the State veil to reach the State organs behind it.  
It should be kept in mind that the constituting treaties of 
most international courts consider States in similar terms as 
the ICJ.  In terms of input, the direct participation of individu-
als and the referral procedure for national courts constitute im-
portant differences between some of the other international 
courts discussed here and in the ICJ.  Nonetheless, the underly-
ing treaties envisage a relationship between these courts and 
their State parties as unitary actors.131  Thus, in terms of out-
put, other international courts deal with State organs in a legal 
framework that is largely comparable to that of the ICJ. 
  
 128. Avena, Order, supra note 115, at para. 16. 
 129. Public hearings in the case have been scheduled for December 15–19, 
2003.  See http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/imus/imus/imuscontent.htm.  
 130. Texas to Ignore Court Order to Stay Executions, L.A. TIMES, Feb 7, 2003 
at A33, available at 2003 WL 2383552 (last visited Aug. 22, 2003).  
 131. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 9, at 299–93.  
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This Section will now, in a necessarily anecdotal manner, dis-
cuss how the European Court of Justice, the European Court of 
Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and 
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) have dealt with the in-
ternational obligations of State organs. 
1. The European Court of Justice 
The case law of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) is un-
doubtedly the most far-reaching and inspiring in its treatment 
of State organs.  This Article will only offer some cursory com-
ments on its relevance since the ECJ’s piercing of the State veil 
is so well known.132  
First, the ECJ played a pivotal role in transforming the 
European legal order from a traditional international law model 
to a model of direct obligation of State organs.133  While today 
European law undoubtedly forms a distinct legal order,134 at its 
conception this order had more similarities than differences 
with international law.135  
Second, the ECJ applies and interprets both European and 
international law as directly affecting State organs.  Under cer-
tain circumstances, the ECJ applies treaties between the Euro-
  
 132. See KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW: 
THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE (Oxford University 
Press 2001) [hereinafter ALTER].  See also DIRECT EFFECT: RETHINKING A 
CLASSIC OF EC LEGAL DOCTRINE (Jolande M. Prinssen & Annette Schrauwen 
eds., 2002).  For a concise description of the European Court of Justice, see 
JEAN ALLAIN, A CENTURY OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE RULE OF LAW 
AND ITS LIMITS 157–79 (T.M.C. Asser Press 2000); see also Helfer & Slaughter, 
supra note 9, at 290–93. 
 133. See Wasilkowski, supra note 19, at 333–36.  
 134. Cf. Mattias Kumm, Who is the Final Arbiter of Constitutionality in 
Europe?: Three Conceptions of the Relationship Between the German Federal 
Constitutional Court and the European Court of Justice, 36 COMMON MKT. L. 
REV. 351, 356–357 (1999) (describing the specific characteristics of the “eman-
cipated” European legal order). 
 135. As Karen Alter explains: 
The EU’s legal system may today be more “supranational” than “in-
ternational.”  But this was not always so.  To forget the European 
Community’s origin as an international legal system would miss an 
important opportunity to learn lessons from the European experience 
that are potentially valuable for other international legal systems.  
ALTER, supra note 132, at xii. 
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pean Community and third parties,136 the European Convention 
of Human Rights,137 and other sources of international law.138  
Both its historical development and concurrent application of 
European and international law make the ECJ’s case law rele-
vant when assessing the black-box theory. 
Third, the direct obligation of national courts has not only 
stimulated compliance with ECJ rulings, it has also brought 
about innovations in European law.  The refusal of certain na-
tional courts, in particular the German Constitutional Court, in 
the Solange cases,139 to recognize the supremacy of European 
Union law in the absence of human rights guarantees, prom-
pted the development of human rights in European law.140  State 
organ obligation in international law may likewise stimulate 
the dialogue between national and international actors, and, if 
only through exceptional cases of disobedience, enhance the 
quality of international law. 
2. The European Court of Human Rights 
The binding force of the judgments of the European Court of 
Human Rights (“ECHR”) is established in Article 46 (formerly 
  
 136. See PAUL CRAIG & GRÁINNE DE BÚRCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND 
MATERIALS 179–85 (2nd ed. 1998) (explaining the ECJ’s “direct effect” policy in 
applying international agreements). 
 137. See, e.g., Xavier Groussot, UK Immigration Law under Attack and the 
Direct Application of Article 8 ECHR by the ECJ, 3 NON-STATE ACTORS AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (forthcoming 2003) (on file with author). 
 138. See generally Trevor C. Hartley, International Law and the Law of the 
European Union — A Reassessment, 72 Y.B. OF INT’L L. 1 (2002); Jan Klabbers, 
International Law in Community Law: The Law and Politics of Direct Effect, 
21 Y.B. OF EURO. L. 263 (2002); Anne Peters, The Position of International 
Law Within The European Community Legal Order, 40 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT’L 
L. 9 (1997).  
 139. See Solange I: BVerfGE 74, 358, 26.3.1987, available at http://www.oe 
fre.unibe.ch/law/dfr/bv037271.html; Solange II: BVerfGE 89, 155, 12.10.1993 
available at http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/dfr/bv073339.html#Opinion. See 
ALTER, supra note 132, at 90–94. 
 140. See also Solange III: BVerfGE 102, 147, 7.6.2000, available at 
http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/dfr/bv102147.html.  For an analysis of the rela-
tionship between national courts and the ECJ, see NIKOS LAVRANOS, 
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN LEGAL ORDERS: A STUDY ON THE INTERACTIONS 
BETWEEN DECISIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, THE EUROPEAN AND 
DOMESTIC LEGAL ORDERS OF SELECTED EU MEMBER STATES, ch. 4 (Europa Law 
Publishing, Groningen) (forthcoming March 2004) (on file with author). 
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Article 53) of the European Convention of Human Rights, which 
declares, “the High Contracting Parties undertake to abide by 
the final judgment of the ECHR in any case to which they are 
parties.”141  Many commentators now interpret decisions of the 
ECHR as bearing directly on State organs.142  Judge Martens 
characterized those obligated by his decisions as “all institutions 
of the respondent State: the legislature, the executive and the 
judiciary,” and he particularly stressed that then Article 53 could 
“imply an obligation on the judiciary” as well.143  Others have 
noted more cautiously that the Court is in the process of aban-
doning a policy of “institution neutrality,”144 and is increasingly 
focusing on the compliance of State parties’ courts with the 
European Convention, rather than on compliance by States as 
entities.145    
A pivotal case in this development is that of Vermeire v. Bel-
gium from 1991.146  It revisited the different inheritance rights 
of legitimate and illegitimate children in Belgium, which the 
Court, in a 1979 case, had declared discriminatory and in viola-
tion of the Convention.147  While the Belgian legislature had ac-
knowledged the problem and started revising the relevant law 
even prior to the 1979 judgment, that process was still under-
way when the case of Mrs. Vermeire came up years later.148  
  
 141. Council of Europe, European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,  art. 46, 1950, ETS No. 5, 213 
U.N.T.S. 221. 
 142. See infra notes 162–64.  
 143. S.K. Martens, Commentary, in COMPLIANCE WITH JUDGMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL COURTS 71, 71–72 (M.K. Bulterman & M. Kujier eds., 1996).   
 144. See Danny Nicol, Lessons from Luxembourg: Federalisation and the 
Court of Human Rights, 26 EUR. L. REV. HUM. RTS. SURV. 3, 13, 18 (2001).  
 145. Id.  
 146. See Vermeire v. Belgium, 214–C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1991).  See Jörg 
Polakiewicz, Die Innerstaatliche Durchsetzung der Urteile des Europäischen 
Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte: Gleichzeitig eine Anmerkung zum Vermeire-
Urteil des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte vom 29. November 
1991 [Domestic Enforcement of Judgments of the European Court of Human 
Rights: The Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 29 Novem-
ber 1991 in the case of Vermeire v. Belgium, with summary in English], 52 
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR AUSLÄNDISCHES ÖFFENTLICHES RECHT UND VÖLKERRECHT 
[JOURNAL OF FOREIGN PUBLIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW] 149–90.  
 147. Marckx v. Belgium, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1979), 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
330.   
 148. Vermeire, 214–C Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 24. 
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Faced with the discriminatory law on the one hand and the 
European Court’s condemnation of that law on the other, the 
Brussels Court of First Instance decided to grant Mrs. Ver-
meire, an illegitimate child, the same inheritance rights as le-
gitimate children in contravention of the law.149  The Brussels 
court reached this result by finding that:  
[T]he prohibition on discrimination between legitimate and il-
legitimate children as regards inheritance rights [was] formu-
lated in the [1979 ECHR] judgment sufficiently clearly and 
precisely to allow a domestic court to apply it directly in the 
cases brought before it.150  
Thus, the Brussels court refused to wait for the “translation” 
of the ECHR judgment into national legislation, and simply 
complied with Belgium’s international obligation.   
However, this reasoning was quashed on appeal and cass-
ation, and Mrs. Vermeire was denied a right of inheritance.151  
The Brussels Court of Appeal addressed the effects of the Euro-
pean Convention and commented that: 
[I]n so far as Article 8 [ECHR] entails negative obligations 
prohibiting arbitrary interference by the State in the private 
or family life of persons residing within its territory, it lays 
down a rule which is  sufficiently precise and comprehensive 
and is directly applicable, but this is not the case in so far as 
Article 8 [ECHR] imposes a positive obligation on the Belgian 
State to create a legal status in conformity with the principles 
stated in the said provision of the Convention;...given that on 
this point the Belgian State has various means to choose from 
for fulfilling this obligation, the provision is no longer suffi-
ciently precise and comprehensive and must be interpreted as 
an obligation to act, responsibility for which is on the legisla-
ture, not the  judiciary.152 
Contrary to the court of first instance, the Brussels Court of 
Appeal felt it could not live up to the international obligation in 
question, because the legislature had not yet “translated” the 
international norm into national law.  However, the argument 
that the provision was not sufficiently precise is a curious one.  
  
 149. Id. at para. 10. 
 150. Id.  
 151. Id. at para. 11.  
 152. Id. at para. 11.  
File: Ferdinandussemacro.doc Created on: 10/19/2003 7:57 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:54 PM 
2003] OUT OF THE BLACK-BOX 85 
While there may have been different ways to achieve the ECHR 
provision’s desired result, the ultimate goal was clear and could 
have been reached by the Court of Appeals, just as the Brussels 
Court of First Instance had initially ruled. 
The European Court did not agree with the Court of Appeal’s 
reasoning.153  It dismissed the Belgian government’s argument 
that the 1979 judgment obliged the Belgian State, but not the 
Belgian courts.154  The Court held in particular that: 
It cannot be seen what could have prevented the Brussels 
Court of Appeal and the Court of Cassation from complying 
with the findings of the Marckx judgment, as the Court of 
First Instance had done.  There was nothing imprecise or in-
complete about the rule which prohibited discrimination 
against Astrid Vermeire compared with her cousins Francine 
and Michel, on the grounds of the “illegitimate” nature of the 
kinship between her and the deceased.…The freedom of choice 
allowed to a State as to the means of fulfilling its obligation 
under Article 53 [(now Article 46 ECHR)] cannot allow it to 
suspend the application of the Convention while waiting for 
such a reform to be completed….155  
Thus, the Court required national courts to enforce their 
State’s obligations under the European Convention, regardless 
of their reception in national law.156  This demand on national 
courts was implicitly affirmed in a subsequent case where the 
ECHR characterized the Andorran Tribunal de Corts as “a 
court not bound by the Convention,” because it is neither 
French nor Spanish, thereby implying that the courts of con-
tracting parties are bound.157  The ECHR effectively established 
an “autonomous direct effect” of the European Convention, 
which to this day requires national courts to act not only as 
  
 153. Id. at para. 24.   
 154. Id. at para. 25.  
 155. Id. at paras. 25–26.  
 156. See Polakiewicz, supra note 146, at 189.  
 157. Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, 240 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 
paras. 96, 110 (1992).  See also Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Mac-
Donald, Bernhardt, Pekkanen and Wildhaber (“It is to be regretted that the 
Convention is not applicable in the territory of Andorra, and that the organs 
of that entity are not bound by it”); Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pettiti, 
Valticos and Lopes Rocha, Approved by Judges Walsh and Spielmann (rhet-
orically addressing the obligations of French officials). 
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State organs, but also as organs of the Convention.158  This type 
of judicial action has led several commentators to liken the 
piercing of the State veil by the ECHR to the practice of the 
ECJ.159  The case law of the ECHR thus represents a particular 
example of the “breaking of the black-box.”160 
3. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACHR”) over-
sees compliance with the American Convention of Human 
Rights161 by those States that have accepted its jurisdiction.  The 
Inter-American system is, like its counterparts on other conti-
nents, designed to deal with States as relevant units.162  Com-
pliance with the IACHR’s judgments is an obligation of the 
  
 158. F.M.C. VLEMMINX, DE AUTONOME RECHTSTREEKSE WERKING VAN HET 
EVRM [THE AUTONOMOUS DIRECT EFFECT OF THE ECHR] 112 (2002).  
 159. Id. at 103; see also Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 9, at 297–98. 
 160. See Polakiewicz, supra note 146, at 189. 
 161. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 
143, 145 (entered into force July 18, 1978). 
 162. See id. art. 2.  Article 2 on domestic legal effects states:  
Where the exercise of any of the rights or freedoms referred to in Ar-
ticle I is not already ensured by legislative or other provisions, the 
States Parties undertake to adopt, in accordance with their constitu-
tional processes and the provisions of this Convention, such legisla-
tive or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to those 
rights or freedoms.  
Id.  See also id. art. 28.  Article 28 states: 
1. Where a State Party is constituted as a federal state, the national 
government of such State Party shall implement all the provisions of 
the Convention over whose subject matter it exercises legislative and 
judicial jurisdiction. 
2. With respect to the provisions over whose subject matter the con-
stituent units of the federal state have jurisdiction, the national gov-
ernment shall immediately take suitable measures, in accordance 
with its constitution and its laws, to the end that the competent au-
thorities of the constituent units may adopt appropriate provisions 
for the fulfilment of this Convention. 
3. Whenever two or more States Parties agree to form a federation or 
other type of association, they shall take care that the resulting fed-
eral or other compact contains the provisions necessary for continu-
ing and rendering effective the standards of this Convention in the 
new state that is organized.   
Id. 
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State as an entity, with the notable exception of the stipulation 
of compensatory damages, for which a form of direct effect is 
established.163  While Article 63(1) of the Convention allows the 
IACHR to determine what specific steps are necessary to rem-
edy a violation, such a determination is to be addressed to and 
implemented by the State.164  
This State-centric approach is reflected in a 1994 Advisory 
Opinion prompted by an initiative of the Peruvian legislature to 
broaden the application of the death penalty in contravention of 
the Convention.165  The two-pronged question posed to the 
IACHR by the Inter-American Commission inquired into the 
legal effects of a law that manifestly violates the Convention, 
insofar as the international obligations of the State are con-
cerned, and “the duties and responsibilities of the agents or offi-
cials” of the State when the enforcement of such a law would 
manifestly violate the Convention.166  Thus, faced with an unor-
thodox invitation to go beyond black-box theory, the IACHR 
declined and gave little more than a formulation of truisms.  
The IACHR unanimously found: 
  
 163. See id. art. 68 at 160.  Article 68 of the Convention states: 
1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties. 
2. That part of a judgment that stipulates compensatory damages 
may be executed in the country concerned in accordance with domes-
tic procedure governing the execution of judgments against the state.   
Id.  See also Thomas Buergenthal, The Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 231, 240 (1982). 
 164. See American Convention on Human Rights, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143, at art. 
63(1).  Article 63(1) reads: 
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right of freedom 
protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured 
party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was vio-
lated.  It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the 
measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right or 
freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the in-
jured party.   
Id.  
 165. See International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement 
of Laws in Violation of the Convention (art. 1 and 2 of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC–14/94 of Dec. 9, 1994, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No. 14.  
 166. Id. at para. 1. 
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(1) That the promulgation of a law in manifest conflict with 
the obligations assumed by a State upon ratifying or acceding 
to the Convention is a violation of that treaty.  Furthermore, if 
such violation affects the protected rights and freedoms of spe-
cific individuals, it gives rise to international responsibility for 
the State in question. 
(2) That the enforcement by agents or officials of a State of a 
law that manifestly violates the Convention gives rise to in-
ternational responsibility for the State in question.  If the en-
forcement of the law as such constitutes an international 
crime, it will also subject the agents or officials who execute 
that law to international responsibility.167 
In reaching its conclusion, the IACHR indicated that it con-
sidered itself subject to strict limits on the interference with the 
domestic legal orders of the State parties to the Convention: 
In exercising its advisory jurisdiction, the Court is not empow-
ered to interpret or define the scope of the validity of the do-
mestic laws of the States parties, but only to address their 
compatibility with the Convention or other treaties concerning 
the protection of human rights in the American States.…In 
the event of a supposed violation of the international obliga-
tions assumed by the State parties resulting from a possible 
conflict between the provisions of their domestic law and those 
contained in the Convention, the former will be evaluated by 
the Court in contentious cases as simple facts or expressions of 
intent which can only be addressed as they relate to the con-
ventions or treaties concerned….The [first] question refers 
only to the legal effects of the law under international law. It 
is not appropriate for the Court to rule on its domestic legal ef-
fect within the state concerned.  That determination is within 
the exclusive jurisdiction of the national courts and should be 
decided in accordance with their laws.168   
Thus, the Court stuck to a classic black-box position.  It spoke 
of the State’s international obligations as an entity, but found 
that domestic consequences of any violations were outside of its 
competence.  Of course, any international ruling on the domes-
  
 167. Id. at paras. 50, 57.  The fact that the promulgation of a conflicting law 
alone amounts to a violation is not surprising, since Article 2 of the IACHR 
establishes the general obligation for all State parties to adapt their internal 
laws to the Convention.  
 168. Id. at paras. 22, 34. 
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tic legal effect of a law would have to directly address the rele-
vant State organs, such as courts, to be meaningful.  The 
IACHR, therefore, could not look into the box.  
But, in 2001, the IACHR crossed these boundaries in the 
Barrios Altos169 case, which focused on certain amnesty laws in 
Peru.170  In 1991, six members of the Peruvian army attacked a 
group of civilians in a neighborhood in Lima known as Barrios 
Altos, killing fifteen civilians.  Two amnesty laws then subse-
quently deterred investigation and prosecution of the matter.171  
Proceedings were initiated on behalf of the victims, first before 
the Inter-American Commission and then before the IACHR.172  
When the Fujimori government collapsed in 2000, Peru funda-
mentally changed its stance in the proceedings.  It recognized 
its international responsibility in the case and declared its will-
ingness to reach a friendly settlement with the petitioners, 
which could subsequently be approved by the Court under Arti-
cle 52.2 of the Rules of Procedure.173  The Court subsequently set 
out to determine the legal effects of the State’s acquiescence, as 
well as appropriate reparations. 
The Commission’s delegate asked the Court inter alia to de-
clare the incompatibility of the amnesty laws with the Ameri-
can Convention and the State’s obligation to annul the amnesty 
laws.174  The Court, however, went beyond the language of these 
requests and found that: 
Owing to the manifest incompatibility of self-amnesty laws 
and the American Convention on Human Rights, the said laws 
lack legal effect and may not continue to obstruct the investi-
gation of the grounds on which this case is based or the identi-
fication and punishment of those responsible, nor can they 
  
 169. Barrios Altos, (Chimbipuma Aguierre et al.  v. Peru), Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 75 (Mar. 14, 2001), 41 I.L.M. 93 (2002) [hereinafter 
Barrios Altos, Judgment].  See also Barrios Altos, Interpretation of the Judg-
ment on the Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83 (Sept. 3, 2001) (avail-
able at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/C/83-ing.html) [hereinafter Bar-
rios Altos, Merits]; Barrios Altos Case, Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. 
C) No. 87 (Nov. 30, 2001), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr 
/C/87-ing.html [hereinafter Barrios Altos, Reparations].  
 170. See Barrios Altos, Judgment, supra note 169, at para. 2.  
 171. Id. at paras. 4–19.  
 172. Id. at paras. 7, 19.  
 173. Id. at paras. 37–39. 
 174. Id. at para. 36. 
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have the same or a similar impact with regard to other cases 
that have occurred in Peru, where the rights established in the 
American Convention have been violated.175 
Therefore, the Court decided unanimously that Amnesty 
Laws No. 26479 and No. 26492 were “incompatible with the 
American Convention on Human Rights and, consequently, 
lack[ed] legal effect.”176  This finding begs the question — in 
what sense did the Amnesty laws lack legal effect?  Was it on 
the international plane or within the Peruvian legal order?  The 
former interpretation would be peculiar since national laws are 
not normally said to have “legal effects” on the international 
plane.  As the Court acknowledged in its 1994 Advisory Opin-
ion, national laws can merely be determinative of relevant 
facts.177  The latter interpretation would be no less peculiar, 
since it would mean that the Court would strike down a na-
tional law directly, instead of obliging the State to do so. 
The IACHR’s judgment is rather ambiguous in this regard, as 
demonstrated in the separate opinions attached by three of the 
Court’s judges.  Judge De Roux stated that “[a]s a consequence 
of the manifest incompatibility between self-amnesty laws and 
the American Convention on Human Rights, the State of Peru 
must abrogate these laws so that they do not continue to repre-
sent an obstacle” to the required prosecutions.178  Thus, he in-
terpreted the lack of legal effect as not automatically extending 
to the Peruvian legal order.  Meanwhile, Judge Cançado Trin-
dade observed that self-amnesty laws have “no legal validity at 
all in the light of the norms of international human rights law,” 
but also that “the State has the obligation to cease the situation 
that violates fundamental human rights (by promptly abrogat-
  
 175. Id. at para. 44. 
 176. Id. at para. 51(4). 
 177. See German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (F.R.G. v. Pol), 1926 
P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 7, at 19 (May 25) (“From the standpoint of International 
Law and of the Court which is its organ, municipal laws are merely facts 
which express the will and constitute the activities of States, in the same 
manner as do legal decisions or administrative measures.”). 
 178. Barrios Altos, Judgment, supra note 169, at para. 42. (separate opinion 
Judge de Roux).  
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ing such laws),”179 thereby bringing no greater clarity to the 
question.  Finally, Judge Ramirez stated unequivocally that: 
[T]his incompatibility signifies that those laws are null and 
void, because they are at odds with the State’s international 
commitments.  Therefore, they cannot produce the legal effects 
inherent in laws promulgated normally and which are com-
patible with the international and constitutional provisions 
that engage the State of Peru.  The incompatibility determines 
the invalidity of the act, which signifies that the said act can-
not produce legal effects.180   
Thus, contrary to Judge De Roux’s opinion, Judge Ramirez 
interpreted the law’s lack of legal effect as directly extending to 
the Peruvian legal order, while Judge Trindade’s opinion is am-
biguous in this regard. 
While the judges themselves seemed divided on the precise 
scope of their holding, the judgment certainly can be read as an 
incursion into the Peruvian legal order, striking down the am-
nesty laws directly.181  It is noteworthy that the operative para-
graph contains no further pronouncement on the obligations of 
Peru with regard to the laws.  If the lack of legal effect were 
restricted to the international plane, then surely the Court 
would have ordered the State to abrogate the laws, just as it 
decided that “the State of Peru should investigate the facts… 
and punish those responsible.”182  Instead, the Court simply de-
clared that the laws lacked legal effect.  
Even taking into account the acquiescence of Peru, the 
Court’s ruling undoubtedly surpasses the normal functioning of 
an international human rights tribunal in determining the va-
lidity of a national law within the nation’s own legal order.  The 
Court’s determination also exceeds the limits the Court itself 
formulated in its 1994 Advisory Opinion by requiring the obedi-
ence of the relevant Peruvian State organs.  
  
 179. Id. at para. 11 (concurring opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade) (em-
phasis added). 
 180. Id. at para. 15 (concurring opinion of Judge Ramirez). 
 181. See Christina M. Cerna, Judicial And Similar Proceedings — Inter-
American Court of Human Rights: Barrios Altos Case (Chumbipuma Aguirre 
Et Al. v. Peru), Introductory Note, 41 I.L.M. 91, 92 (2002) (stating that the 
Court declared the amnesty laws “void of any legal effect.”). 
 182. See Barrios Altos, Judgment, supra note 169, at para. 51(5). 
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Just weeks after the judgment of the Inter-American Court, 
the Peruvian Supreme Court decided to give effect to the judg-
ment, “which resulted in the reopening of the Barrios Altos case 
at the national level and the rendering of the amnesty laws 
without effect.”183  While the Court referred to the authorization 
in Peruvian law to execute international court judgments,184 it 
also relied on the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties in 
language that pointed to a broader obligation of State organs 
under international law: 
That Peru is a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, which establishes by its twenty-seventh article that 
“[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as 
justification for its failure to perform a treaty,” in the spirit of 
which, the Consejo Supremo de Justicia Militar, as an integral 
part of the Peruvian State, must comply with the interna-
tional ruling in accordance with its terms and in such manner 
as to implement the decision it contains in its entirety, vesting 
it with full effect and eliminating any obstacle presented by 
substantive or procedural internal law that might stand in the 
way of its due execution and full performance….185 
  
 183. Cerna, supra note 181, at 92.  See Peruvian Supreme Court, Judgments 
of June 1, 2001 and June 4, 2001 (on file with author). 
 184. See Texto Unico de la Ley Organica del Poder Judicial (Peruvian), art. 
151, available at http://www.Minjus.gob.pe (last visited Sept. 2, 2003).  As 
Peruvian Supreme Court explained: 
Las sentencias expedidas por los Tribunales Internacionales, consti-
tuídos según Tratados de los que es parte el Perú, son transcritas por 
el Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores al Presidente de la Corte Su-
prema, quien las remite a la Sala en que se agotó la jurisdicción in-
terna y dispone la ejecución de la sentencia supranacional por el 
Juez  Especializado o Mixto competente. 
[The decisions handed down by the international tribunals, consti-
tuted pursuant to the treaties to which Peru is a party, are communi-
cated by the Ministry of External Relations to the President of the 
Supreme Court, who forwards them to the court where domestic ju-
risdiction was exhausted and orders the implementation of the supra 
national decision by relevant specialized or mixed-competent judge.] 
Id. 
 185. Peruvian Supreme Court Judgment of June 4, 2001, unofficial transla-
tion by Mason Weisz [hereinafter Peruvian Supreme Court Judgment].  The 
original text reads as follows: 
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Much like the Malaysian High Court in Cumaraswamy,186 the 
Peruvian Supreme Court displayed its conviction that courts, 
like other State organs, have an independent duty to comply 
with international law as it noted that the courts are “an inte-
gral part of the Peruvian State,”187 making them equally respon-
sible for the nation’s international obligations. 
When Peru later disputed the applicability of the nullification 
of amnesty laws to similar cases, the Inter-American Court in 
interpreting the judgment clarified that “the effects of the deci-
sion in the judgment on the merits of the Barrios Altos Cases 
were general in nature.”188  The direct interaction with State 
organs in the Barrios Altos case is not unique in the recent case 
law of the IACHR.  In the Ivcher Bronstein case,189 the Court 
held that “both the jurisdictional organs and those of any other 
nature that exercise functions of a substantially jurisdictional 
nature” are obligated to respect the guarantee of due process.190  
The Court formulated a similar due process obligation of all 
State organs involved in jurisdictional matters in the Constitu-
tional Court Case.191  In the Cantos Case,192 the Court established 
  
Que, el Perú es parte de la Convención de Viena sobre Derecho de los 
Tratados, la misma que establece en su artículo veintisiete que “no se 
puede invocar disposiciones de derecho interno como justificación del 
incumplimiento de un Tratado,” en tal sentido, el Consejo Supremo 
de Justicia Militar, como parte integrante del Estado Peruano, debe 
dar cumplimiento a la sentencia internacional en sus propios térmi-
nos y de modo que haga efectiva en todos sus extremos la decisión que 
ella contiene, otorgándole plenitud de efectos y levantado todo obsta-
cúlo de derecho material y procesal propios del derecho interno que 
impida su debida ejecución y su cumplimiento en forma integral.   
Id.  Cf. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, infra note 286. 
 186. See supra Part III.A.ii. 
 187. Peruvian Supreme Court Judgment, supra note 185.  
 188. See Barrios Altos, Judgment, supra note 169, at para. 18. 
 189. Ivcher Bronstein Case  (Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru), Merits, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser C) No. 74, para. 104 (Feb. 6, 2001) (“[T]he Court believes 
that both the jurisdictional organs and those of any other nature that exercise 
functions of a substantially jurisdictional nature have the obligation to adopt 
just decisions based on full respect for the guarantee of due process estab-
lished in Article 8 of the American Convention.”). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Constitutional Court (Aguierre Roca, Rey Terry and Revoredo v. Peru), 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 71, para. 71 (Jan. 31, 2001) (“[A]ny 
State organ that exercises functions of a materially jurisdictional nature has 
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a violation of the obligation of the judicial authorities involved 
to safeguard the right of access to the court system.193  In the 
Trujillo Oroza case,194 the respondent State itself indicated that 
it would welcome a similar intervention in the national legal 
order as in Barrios Altos.195  To overcome the obstacle of a stat-
ute of limitations that prevented the required criminal proceed-
ings, Bolivia suggested a judgment of the IACHR that would 
“amend or modify the decision of domestic courts.”196  However, 
this proved unnecessary since the Constitutional Court of Bo-
livia set aside the statute of limitations before the IACHR could 
do so.197  In Hilaire,198 the Court found that Trinidad and To-
bago’s Advisory Committee on the Power of Pardon “must re-
submit the victim’s case to the executive authority competent to 
render a decision regarding that mercy procedure.”199  Finally, 
  
the obligation to adopt decisions that are in consonance with the guarantees of 
due legal process in the terms of Article 8 of the American Convention.”).   
 192. Cantos Case, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 97, para. 60, 
(Nov. 28, 2002).  
 193. The Court observed that: 
[I]n the case sub judice, [the] application of the filing fee and...pro-
fessional fees strictly according to the letter of the law meant that ex-
orbitant amounts were charged, with the effect of obstructing Mr. 
Cantos’ access to the court….The judicial authorities should have 
taken appropriate steps to prevent this situation from materializing 
and [should have] ensure[d] effective access to the court and effective 
observance and exercise of the right to judicial guarantees and judi-
cial protection.   
Id. 
 194. Trujillo Oroza Case (Trujillo Oroza v. Bolivia), Reparations, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (Ser. C) No. 92 (Feb. 27, 2002). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. at para. 93(a).  Bolivia asserted that: “[I]t ha[d] no objection to those 
guilty of th[e] crime being tried…[nor] to the Court declaring some type of 
legal solution so that a judgment of the Inter-American Court [could] amend 
or modify the decision of [the] domestic courts.”  Id.  
 197. Id. at par. 107–108. 
 198. Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. Case (Hilaire v. Trinidad and 
Tobago), Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Series C) No. 92, para. 214 (June 21, 
2002).   
 199. But see id. at para. 223(10) (Court unanimously declares that, “the 
State should submit before the competent authority and by means of the Ad-
visory Committee on the Power of Pardon … the review of the cases.” ).  
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State organs, including courts, have directly referred to and 
obeyed the IACHR’s orders in numerous cases.200 
4. The International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia 
A traditional voice on the concept of State organ obligation 
exists in the case law of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”).  The case to be discussed re-
sulted from an order addressed to both Croatia and its Defense 
Minister to cooperate in certain matters regarding the case 
against Timohir Blaskic.201  Croatia challenged the authority of 
the Tribunal to issue such a subpoena duces tecum in general, 
and to a State official in particular.202  On July 18, 1997, the 
Trial Chamber dismissed Croatia’s objections in a decision that 
is very much in line with the developments in other courts just 
described.203  The Trial Chamber noted that Article 18(2) of the 
ICTY Statute204 gave the prosecutor “express authority to deal 
with State ‘authorities’ in particular, rather than the State as 
an abstract entity.”205  The Tribunal reasoned that “States must 
always act through their officials and thus the authority to is-
sue binding orders to States by necessary implication carries 
the authority to issue such orders to their officials.”206  In the 
  
 200. See PASQUALUCCI, supra note 108, at 330, 332–34, 338–39. 
 201. Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of 
Subpoena Duces Tecum, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14, Trial 
Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, July 
18, 1997, at para. 6, available at http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialc1/decis 
ions-e/70718P2.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2003) [hereinafter Blaskic, Objec-
tion].  
 202. Id. at para. 14.  
 203. Id. at para. 157.  
 204. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, art. 18(2), May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1183 (1993) (“The Prosecutor 
shall have the power to question suspects, victims and witnesses, to collect 
evidence and to conduct on-site investigations.  In carrying out these tasks, 
the Prosecutor may, as appropriate, seek the assistance of the State authori-
ties concerned.”). 
 205. Blaskic, Objection, supra note 201, at para. 67 (“[E]xpress authority to 
deal with State ‘authorities’ in particular, rather than the State as an abstract 
entity, and demonstrates that the International Tribunal is not required to 
proceed through designated State channels, but can approach those officials 
who are most directly responsible for compliance.”). 
 206. Id. at para. 69.  
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same vein, the Tribunal considered that a State can only act 
through its officials and, therefore, their obligations must corre-
spond to those of the State.207 
While the decision concluded that “there is a clear obligation 
on both States and their officials to comply fully” with the Tri-
bunal’s subpoenas,208 the Trial Chamber was not entirely un-
aware of the difficulties surrounding their holding.  The deci-
sion discussed at length the difficulties that could arise if a 
State prohibited its officials from complying with orders of the 
Tribunal, concluding that in such circumstances, it may not be 
proper for the Tribunal to hold the official to her obligations.209  
Moreover, the decision ended with a remarkable description of 
the Tribunal’s goals, as if the Trial Chamber felt it needed to 
supplement its legal reasoning with an appeal to effective-
ness.210   
Nevertheless, the ICTY Appeals Chamber was not impressed 
with the Blaskic holding and drastically reversed course just 
months later.211  It found that Article 18(2) allowed the Prosecu-
  
 207. Id. at para. 91.  As the Tribunal specifically noted:  
[A] State has a duty to comply, a government official to whom a sub-
poena duces tecum is issued in his official capacity has a correspond-
ing duty to comply.  Indeed, it would be anomalous to consider that 
his duty is less than that of the State from which he receives his au-
thority, since a State may only act through its competent officials.   
Id. 
 208. Id. at para. 150. 
 209. Id. at paras. 92–96. 
 210. Id. at para. 154.  The Tribunal explained that:     
The International Tribunal was established to aid in the restoration 
and maintenance of peace in the former Yugoslavia.  As a criminal 
court, its primary obligation is to provide a fair and expeditious trial 
and to guarantee the rights of the accused.  This adjudicatory process 
strengthens the rule of law, a fundamental principle shared by all 
members of the international community.  If effective, this may con-
tribute to reconciliation, which is a precondition for lasting peace.  
Thus, the Trial Chamber cannot endorse the contention that States 
and government officials have no obligation to comply with orders of 
the International Tribunal.   
Id.  
 211. Judgment on the Request of the Republic of Croatia for Review of the 
Decision of Trial Chamber II of July 18, 1997, Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. 
IT–95–14, Appeals Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, Oct. 29, 1997, available at http://www.un.org/icty/blaskic/appeal/d 
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tor to seek the assistance of a particular State official, but did 
not imply a corresponding international obligation for that offi-
cial to cooperate, stating instead that such an obligation “is only 
incumbent upon the State.”212  In more general terms, the ICTY 
Appeals Chamber found that international law protects the in-
ternal organization of the State, including the right to instruct 
its organs,213 noting: 
[B]oth under general international law and the Statute itself, 
Judges or Trial Chambers cannot address binding orders to 
State officials….[I]t is indubitable that States, being the ad-
dressees of obligation[s of result], have some choice or leeway 
in identifying the persons responsible for, and the method of, 
its fulfillment.  It is for each such State to determine the in-
ternal organs competent to carry out the order.  It follows that 
if a Judge or a Chamber intends to order the production of 
documents, the seizure of evidence, the arrest of suspects etc., 
being acts involving action by a State, its organs or officials, 
they must turn to the relevant State.214 
Therefore, the Appeals Chamber held that the Tribunal could 
address binding orders to States as well as private individuals, 
but not to State officials.  
Much can be said to qualify the Tribunal’s holding.  The case 
predates the ICJ’s decisions in LaGrand and Cumaraswamy, 
and thus could not take into account the clear determination of 
  
ecision-e/71029JT3.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003) [hereinafter Blaskic, Re-
view].  
 212. Id. at para. 42. 
 213. Id. at para. 41.  The Tribunal specifically stated: 
It is well known that customary international law protects the inter-
nal organization of each sovereign State: it leaves it to each sovereign 
State to determine its internal structure and in particular to desig-
nate the individuals acting as State agents or organs.  Each sovereign 
State has the right to issue instructions to its organs, both those op-
erating at the internal level and those operating in the field of inter-
national relations, and also to provide for sanctions or other remedies 
in case of non-compliance with those instructions.  The corollary of 
this exclusive power is that each State is entitled to claim that acts or 
transactions performed by one of its organs in its official capacity be 
attributed to the State, so that the individual organ may not be held 
accountable for those acts or transactions.   
Id. 
 214. Id. at para. 43. 
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State organ obligation in those cases.  The question of whether 
officials can be subpoenaed is much more complex than the in-
quiry of their obligations under international law.  First, di-
rectly addressing officials leaves the State uninformed and con-
sequently unable to respond; a distinction from the ICJ deci-
sions where the obligations of the State organs were communi-
cated to the central government.  Second, subpoenas are ulti-
mately enforced by criminal sanctions, making them more in-
trusive than normal obligations under international law.  Fi-
nally, it is significant that the Appeals Chamber noted that ex-
ceptions exist to the rule that customary international law pro-
tects the internal organization of States.215  Yet, in light of the 
categorical language of the decision, and the holding that 
clearly sets State organs apart from States and individuals, it 
should be acknowledged that the ICTY ultimately declined to 
pierce the State veil and adhered closely to black-box theory.  
In a later case, the Court was slightly less determined.216  
When Slobodan Milosevic challenged the validity of his arrest 
and extradition to the ICTY, the Trial Chamber was asked to 
declare his transfer unlawful.217  According to the amici curiae 
in the case, the transfer lacked a basis in Serbian law, and the 
international obligation to transfer Milosevic lay with the Fed-
eral Republic of Yugoslavia, and not with its constituent part, 
the Republic of Serbia.218  The Trial Chamber followed the amici 
in accepting that the obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal 
under Article 29 of the Statute was that of the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, and not the Republic of Serbia.219  Nevertheless, it 
found that Rule 58, which in turn refers to Article 29, applied 
and that the transfer was made in accordance with the statute’s 
provisions.220  The ruling, therefore, implied that the obligation 
of the State (the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) was also the 
  
 215. Id. at para. 41.  See also GAJA, supra note 19, at 4. 
 216. See generally Konstantinos D. Magliveras, The Interplay Between the 
Transfer of Slobodan Milosevic to the ICTY and Yugoslav Constitutional Law, 
13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 661 (2002). 
 217. Id. at 669.  
 218. Decision on Preliminary Motions, Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT–
02–54, Trial Chamber, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugo-
slavia, Nov. 8, 2001, at para. 35, available at http://www.un.org/icty/Milosevic/ 
trialc/decision-e/1110873516829.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 2003). 
 219. Id. at para. 43. 
 220. Id. at para. 46. 
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obligation of its constituent part (Serbia).  Furthermore, the 
President of the Tribunal later praised “the resolve of the au-
thorities of Serbia to comply with its international obligations 
arising out of Security Council resolution 827 and Article 29 of 
the Statute of the International Tribunal.”221 
5. Dispute Settlement in the WTO 
The WTO operates within a classic black-box framework.  The 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) of 1947 con-
tains a federal clause in Article XXIV(12) which reads: 
Each contracting party shall take such reasonable measures 
as may be available to it to ensure observance of the provi-
sions of this Agreement by the regional and local governments 
and authorities within its territories.222  
This provision reflects the fact that the obligations under the 
GATT of 1947 were limited to the State, and did not extend to 
its territorial organs.  As the U.S. pointed out in the Prepara-
tory Committee: 
[I]t is necessary to distinguish between central or federal gov-
ernments, which undertake these obligations in a firm way, 
and local authorities, which are not strictly bound, so to speak, 
by the provisions of the Agreement, depending of course upon 
the constitutional procedure of the country concerned.223 
However, the meaning of Article XXIV(12) turned out to be 
slightly more complicated than expected.  Many found the in-
terpretation of the GATT of 1947 as requiring nothing more 
than reasonable efforts in cases under the control of its territo-
rial organs, regardless of outcome, as unsatisfactory, because it 
undermined treaty effectiveness.224 Consequently, the un-
adopted 1985 Panel report on “Canada — Measures Affecting 
  
 221. ICTY Press Release, Address by his Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, 
President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 
to the UN General Assembly, U.N. Doc. JD/P.I.S./640–e (Nov. 27, 2001), 
available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p640–e.htm (last visited Sept. 2, 
2003).  
 222. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, Art. XXIV (12) 
[hereinafter GATT].  
 223. EPCT/TAC/PV/19 at 33, cited in GATT ANALYTICAL INDEX: GUIDE TO 
GATT LAW AND PRACTICE 772 (6th ed. 1994). 
 224. Id.  
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the Sale of Gold Coins” rejected this interpretation.225  According 
to the panel, Article XXIV(12) did not limit the applicability of 
the treaty provisions; rather, it merely limited the obligation of 
States to secure their implementation.226  This reading was also 
adopted in the 1992 Panel report on “Canada — Import, Distri-
bution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by Provincial Mar-
keting Agencies.”227  The import of Article XXIV(12) was further 
reduced when the panel in “United States — Measures Affect-
ing Alcoholic and Malt Beverages” (1992) concluded that based 
on the drafting history, the Article was designed to apply only 
to those measures of territorial organs which the central gov-
ernment is powerless to control.228  Thus, where the State has no 
constitutional authority to force its territorial organs to comply 
with its GATT obligations, Article XXIV(12) releases the State 
from the strict obligation to secure compliance, but requires the 
State to make a reasonable effort to do so and imposes State 
responsibility for any breach.  This interpretation was clarified 
in the Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of 
the GATT of 1994 that was adopted during the Uruguay rounds 
of the Multicultural Trade Negotiations.229  
In WTO instruments and disputes, a firm distinction exists 
between the central State and its territorial organs.  The WTO 
  
 225. Canada — Measures Affecting the Sale of Gold Coins, Sept. 17, 1985, 
GATT Doc. L/5863, 1985 WL 291500 (unadopted GATT panel report). 
 226. Id. at paras. 53–64.  
 227. Canada: Import, Distribution and Sale of Certain Alcoholic Drinks by 
Provincial Marketing Agencies, Feb. 18, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 
86–87 (1993) (“[T]he provisions of the General Agreement were applicable to 
measures by regional and local governments and authorities notwithstanding 
Article XXIV:12.  This followed clearly from the obligation set out in this pro-
vision ‘to ensure observance of the provisions of this Agreement’ by such gov-
ernments and authorities because a provision could only be ‘observed’ by a 
government or authority if it was applicable to it.”). 
 228. United States Measures Affecting Alcoholic and Malt Beverages, June 
19, 1992, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 296 (1993).  
 229. See Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 para. 13, Final Act Embodying the Re-
sults of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 14, 1994, 
LEGAL INSTRUMENTS — RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND, vol. 1 (1994), 33 
I.L.M. 1125, 1163 (1994) (“Each member is fully responsible under GATT 1994 
for the observance of all provisions of GATT 1994, and shall take such reason-
able measures as may be available to it to ensure such observance by regional 
and local governments and authorities within its territory.”).  
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addresses all obligations to the State, which is responsible for 
any breach, even where it is constitutionally powerless to con-
trol its organs.230  Therefore, the WTO practice firmly adheres to 
black-box theory.   
IV. ANALYSIS 
The case law presented above forms a diverse collection, in-
volving different courts, different fields of law, and contentious 
judgments as well as advisory opinions.  For the more recent 
decisions, it remains to be seen whether they will go down in 
the legal annals as exceptions or innovations.  Still, analyzing 
those cases together sensitizes scholars to the fact that even the 
decisions that are exceptional in the case law of their courts fit 
a pattern of similar judicial thinking that can be found both in 
national231 and international courts.  
While the cases described do not amount to evidence of a 
wholesale rejection of black-box theory in international law, 
they do represent a growing challenge to the notion that inter-
national obligations bind only the State as an entity and not its 
organs.  As noted, this occurrence is not a new phenomenon.  
However, the breadth of this trend and the authority of the in-
ternational courts involved might now create a critical mass 
that will endure and eventually reverse the rule and exception 
regarding State organ obligation under international law.  For 
particular categories of obligations and fields of law, for exam-
ple human rights, the black-box theory may already be out-
dated. 232 
  
 230. See, e.g., Australian Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon, 
WT/DS18/RW (Feb. 18, 2000), available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade 
/negotiations/disputes/wtodisputes-Australiasalmon.html (last visited Oct. 17, 
2003).  
 231. See supra note 9.   
 232. See CASSESE, supra note 32, at 181; Bedjaoui, supra note 65, at 23.  
Bedjaoui may be overly optimistic in stating that:  
It is no longer conceivable that a national court should require au-
thority to execute an international judicial decision.…[T]he barrier 
between international law and municipal law has collapsed in whole 
sectors of activity.  The development of universal or regional organi-
zations, and the appearance of certain elements of supranationality, 
have occasioned a more widespread osmosis of international decisions 
into the national legal order.  It therefore comes as no surprise that, 
 
File: Ferdinandussemacro.doc Created on:  10/19/2003 7:57 PM Last Printed: 1/13/2004 2:54 PM 
102 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 29:1 
The prospects for change are fuelled by material changes in 
international law that should be expected to develop rather 
than regress.  In this section, we will first analyze how material 
changes in international law underlie the trend towards State 
organ obligation.  Second, we will set forth an alternative model 
to black-box theory on the basis of the cases described.  This 
analysis should be understood as just that: a view of the alter-
native to black-box theory among many possible others.  Fi-
nally, we will briefly address some of the policy considerations 
involved. 
A. Background: Change in Public International Law 
That the character of international law has changed pro-
foundly in the last century is a truism repeated to the point of 
becoming meaningless.233  Still, this development is crucial for 
our understanding of the challenge to black-box theory and its 
prospects.  The ICJ and other courts’ attempts to pierce the 
State veil are both evidence and consequences of this change.  
This Article will paint the picture of international law’s devel-
opment only in broad strokes, focusing on four specific points of 
change: (1) the emergence of non-State subjects of international 
law; (2) international law’s growing regulatory power; (3) the 
increased emphasis on the multilateral formulation of general 
rules; and, (4) international law’s ever-growing accessibility and 
precision.  While these points are strongly interconnected and 
partly overlapping, they provide an accurate portrayal of the 
legal transformation behind the cases relevant to this Article’s 
analysis.    
First, current international law includes many subjects be-
sides the State.  This change in itself places pressure on a con-
ceptual framework that was shaped by the legal interactions of 
States alone.234  Individuals, companies and international or-
  
at the present time, international judgments — and more particu-
larly those of the European courts — are increasingly received both 
directly and automatically by the national courts.    
Id. 
 233. For an early account, see WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING 
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW ivii (Columbia University Press, 1964).  
 234. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American 
Human Rights Court, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 20 (1985) (“A legal system devel-
oped over centuries to regulate relations between states must make consider-
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ganizations now have limited capacities to act on the interna-
tional plane.  These entities are also affected, directly or indi-
rectly, more often than ever before by international law.235  
Second, international law now regulates many subject mat-
ters previously under the exclusive control of the national legis-
lator.236  International law has come a long way from being “the 
minimal law necessary to enable state-societies to act as closed 
systems internally and to act as territory-owners in relation to 
each other.”237  The oft-described move from a law of coexistence 
to a law of cooperation has led to a vast expansion of topics cov-
ered by international law.238  The domaine réservé is today more 
a relic than reality.   
  
able conceptual adjustments to accommodate the extension of its normative 
reach to individuals.”) [hereinafter Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice]. 
 235. See Pescatore, Conclusion, supra note 25, at 274.   As Pescatore ex-
plains: 
International treaties in our time, with few exceptions, are of concern 
not only to the states as such…they have a direct bearing on the 
rights and interests of individuals, physical or corporate.…In contrast 
it is rather difficult to find treaties the effects of which could be con-
tained entirely on the level of pure interstate relations.…We may 
thus take as a premise that, for the great majority of international 
treaties in our time, the way in which these treaties are executed and 
implemented by the contracting states in their internal order is of 
primary concern.   
Id. 
 236. See John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution, Non-Self-Execution 
and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1956–58 n. 220 
(1999); Walter Kälin, Implementing Treaties in Domestic Law: From “Pacta 
Sunt Servanda” to “Anything Goes”?, in MULTILATERAL TREATY-MAKING: THE 
CURRENT STATUS OF CHALLENGES TO AND REFORMS NEEDED IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 119 (Vera Gowlland-Debbas et al. eds., 
2000). 
 237. PHILIP ALLOTT, EUNOMIA: NEW ORDER FOR A NEW WORLD 324 (Oxford 
University Press 1990). 
 238. See Michael Cottier, Die Anwendbarkeit von Völkerrechtlichen Normen 
im Innerstaatlichen Bereich als Ausprägung der Konstitutionalisierung des 
Völkerrechts [The Applicability of International Law Norms in the Domestic 
Sphere as the Development of the Constitutionality of International Law], 9 
SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR INTERNATIONALES UND EUROPÄISCHES RECHT 
[S.Z.I.E.R., SWISS JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LAW] 403, 413–
15 (1999).  
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Third, international law is increasingly legislative and less a 
set of bilateral contractual relations between States.239  This 
change can be witnessed not only in the content of treaties, but 
also in their form.  The multilateral formulation of general rules 
has become a pivotal part of modern international law, ending 
the dominance of concrete, bilateral arrangements between 
States.240  The increased importance of multilateral treaties is a 
relatively recent phenomenon.241   
Fourth, and closely connected to the other changes, interna-
tional law has become increasingly accessible and specific.242  
The proliferation rate of treaties in the last century puts any 
Petri dish to shame.243  Treaties have grown in number, but also 
in precision, formulating both the desired results and how these 
results are to be achieved.  No longer is it a rarity for a treaty 
provision to specify the actions to be taken by legislative, execu-
tive and/or judicial organs.244  
These changes bring forth a growing rapprochment between 
national and international law.  Professor Phillip Allott states 
that the convergence of subjects, topics and form leads to “the 
internationalizing of the national, the nationalizing of the in-
ternational, and the universalizing of value,” as well as the ne-
gating of “the structural duality” between national and interna-
  
 239. This process has a long history.  See Philip Allott, The Concept of Inter-
national Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 31, 43 (1999) (“As international society began 
to increase rapidly in complexity and density from, say, 1815, treaties began 
to perform a social function closely analogous to legislation in national legal 
systems.”). 
 240. See Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in Inter-
national Law, 250 RECUEIL DES COURS (LA HAYE) 217, 323 (1994). 
 241. Id.  
 242. Id.  See also infra notes 246, 247. 
 243. See Louis B. Sohn, Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary Inter-
national Law, in REALISM IN LAW-MAKING: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
HONOUR OF WILLEM RIPHAGEN 231, 231 n.1 (Adriaan Bos & Hugo Siblesz eds., 
1986) (stating that since 1945 more treaties have been adopted than in the 
3000 years before). 
 244. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 3, para. 1, G.A. 
Res. 44/25 (annex), U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 167, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/44/49 (1989) (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) (“In all actions concern-
ing children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institu-
tions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best 
interests of the child shall be a primary consideration.”). 
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tional law.245  In many respects, modern international law re-
sembles national law more than it does the international law of 
a century ago.246  A pertinent example is the law underlying the 
Consular Relations cases before the ICJ.  International law re-
garding the assistance of consular officers to their nationals 
abroad has developed considerably in the last two centuries.  
Before the drafting of the Vienna Convention on Consular Rela-
tions, the subject of consular assistance was generally included 
in bilateral treaties in far less detail, if it was included at all.247  
The 1923 Treaty on Friendship includes an elaborate provision 
regarding Commerce and Consular Rights between the U.S. and 
Germany.248  Article 11 of the Treaty reads: 
Consular officers, nationals of the State by which they are ap-
pointed, may, within their respective consular districts, ad-
dress the authorities, National, State, Provincial or Municipal, 
for the purpose of protecting their countrymen in the enjoy-
ment of their rights accruing by treaty or otherwise.  Com-
plaint may be made for the infraction of those rights.  Failure 
upon the part of the proper authorities to grant redress or to 
accord protection may justify interposition through the diplo-
matic channel, and in the absence of a diplomatic representa-
tive, a consul general or the consular officer stationed at the 
capital may apply directly to the government of the country.249    
This provision allows for consular assistance in very general 
terms, envisaging nationals as objects rather than subjects of 
the law, and specifically determines that any resulting differ-
ences should be resolved through the bilateral diplomatic chan-
nel.  In comparison, the Vienna Convention moves consular as-
  
 245. PHILIP ALLOTT, THE EMERGING UNIVERSAL LEGAL SYSTEM 33 (2002); see 
also GAJA, supra note 19.  
 246. See Yoo, supra note 236, at 1958 (“International agreements are becom-
ing more like the permanent statutes and regulations that characterize the 
domestic legal system, and less like mutually convenient, and temporary, 
compacts to undertake state action.”).  Cf. Frowein, The Implementation, su-
pra note 50, at 85–86 (noting that while the international and national legal 
systems remain separate, there is now an “interdependence of these legal 
orders…probably even more in the day-to-day practice of international as well 
as of State organs, including national courts….”). 
 247. See LUKE T. LEE, CONSULAR LAW AND PRACTICE 17–18 (2d ed. 1991). 
 248. See Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights, Dec. 8, 1923, 
U.S.–F.R.G., 44 Stat. 2132.  
 249. Id. at art. XXI.  
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sistance to an entirely different level.  While the Convention 
includes a similar clause on consular communication with the 
authorities,250 Article 36 addresses consular assistance in great 
detail.251  The differences in specificity and language are unmis-
takable.  Consular assistance to detained nationals is now ad-
dressed in detail and established as a right, not only for the 
consular officer, but also for the detained individual.252  In fact, 
  
 250. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 38, 
21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 294.  
 251. Id. at art. 36.  Article 36 states:  
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relat-
ing to nationals of the sending State: 
(a) [C]onsular officers shall be free to communicate with nation-
als of the sending State and to have access to them.  Nationals of 
the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to 
communication with and access to consular officers of the send-
ing State; 
(b) [I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving 
State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the send-
ing State if, within its consular district, a national of that State 
is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or 
is detained in any other manner.  Any communication addressed 
to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or 
detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without 
delay.  The said authorities shall inform the person concerned 
without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph; 
(c) [C]onsular officers shall have the right to visit a national of 
the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to con-
verse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal repre-
sentation.  They shall also have the right to visit any national of 
the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their 
district in pursuance of a judgment.  Nevertheless, consular offi-
cers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who 
is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such ac-
tion. 
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exer-
cised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving 
State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regula-
tions must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the 
rights accorded under this Article are intended. 
Id. 
 252. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, at para. 77.  But see Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 (The 
convention’s preamble states: “Realizing that the purpose of such privileges 
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the competent authorities of a receiving State now hold a corre-
sponding duty to inform both the detainee and the consular 
post.253  As a result, this provision bears greater similarity to 
national law providing rights for detained individuals than to 
the more contractual language of the old bilateral treaties.254  
While national courts are generally reluctant to attach far-
reaching consequences to this development,255 it is undisputable 
that a similar line of Consular Relations cases could not have 
come before the ICJ on the basis of older treaty provisions such 
as Article 11 of the 1923 treaty.   
The growing similarities and intertwinement of national and 
international law makes their separation increasingly unten-
able.  Pressure grows on actors in both fields to overcome formal 
barriers and to interact more effectively.256  Courts are particu-
larly affected by the evolution of treaties from mere contracts 
between nations towards statute-like law, since, as the U.S. 
Supreme Court stated in Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say 
what the law is.”257 
Moreover, courts frequently feel the additional pressure to 
provide the only realistic chance of enforcement of the law in 
question.  If they do not uphold the international rules, often-
  
and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient per-
formance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States.”).   
 253. See Cassel, Judicial Remedies, supra note 10, at 855–58. 
 254. For an extensive, but ultimately negative comparison with Miranda 
rights see United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 883–84 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 255. See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 69, at 13, 43 (Part II and Part IV). 
 256. Cf. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 9, at 388.  The authors note that:  
In democracies in which individuals are mobilized in support of the 
judgment of a supranational tribunal, compliance with that judgment 
becomes less a question of ceding sovereignty than of responding to 
constituent pressure.  The [S]tate is no longer an interlocking set of 
government institutions in its domestic affairs, with sovereignty 
lodged in the people, and a unitary entity in its foreign relations, with 
sovereignty a fundamental attribute of its statehood.  Instead, its in-
ternal and external face begin to mirror one another, as sovereignty 
becomes inextricably interwoven with accountability. 
Id.; Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legispru-
dence, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 185, 188 (1993).   
 257. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). 
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times, as in Breard and LaGrand, no one else will.258  After all, 
international law fits the traditional framework of self-help less 
everyday as individuals and international organizations are in 
principle incapable of taking any effective measures themselves 
to vindicate their rights, and States are increasingly con-
strained in their capacity to react independently to violations of 
international law.259  Although national courts continue to let 
international obligations pass unvindicated in the majority of 
their decisions, the urge to give effect to otherwise unenforce-
able law can be observed where courts challenge barriers to 
their ability to give effect to international law.260   
Of particular importance is the notion that international law 
is no longer inter-State law.261  The monopoly of the State has 
been broken by the emergence of other subjects of international 
law, most importantly individuals.  This development threatens 
the rule that international norms are ipso facto to be addressed 
to States only.262  One possible response is “the idea that tradi-
tional inter-State law needs to be subsumed within a broader 
process in which old distinctions between public and private 
international law and between municipal and international law 
  
 258. See Benvenisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs, supra note 9, at 424. Cf. 
CONFORTI, INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 9, at 4–5 (The “proliferation of 
international legal norms over the last forty years, however, has not led either 
to corresponding developments in international judicial decisionmaking or to 
corresponding procedures for the coercive enforcement of international 
rules.”). 
 259. For example, States are constrained by free trade regulations, which 
inhibit economic countermeasures, and stricter rules on resorting to armed 
force.  
 260. See, for example, the dissenting opinion of Lord Nicholls in Briggs v. 
Baptiste [2000] 2 A.C. 40, 55.  Lord Nicholls stated that he could not accept 
that the courts of Trinidad and Tobago were “powerless to act” in order to 
prevent Brigg’s execution, exclaiming that:   
By acceding to the [American Convention on Human Rights] Trinidad 
intended to confer benefits on its citizens.  The benefits were in-
tended to be real, not illusory.  The Inter-American system of human 
rights was not intended to be a hollow sham, or, for those under sen-
tence of death, a cruel charade. 
Id.  Appeal taken from Trinidad & Tobago & The Appeal to Effectiveness, in 
Blaskic, Objection, supra note 201, at para. 154.   
 261. See PASQUALUCCI, supra note 108, at 327. 
 262. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Advisory Practice, supra note 234, at 20.  
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are being steadily eroded.”263  If international law can look into 
the black-box to deal with individuals, then an inability to do 
the same with State organs is not self-evident.264  In short, the 
material changes in international law will only be effective if 
they are accompanied by adequate procedural responses.265  
Since these changes provide the driving force behind the chal-
lenge to black-box theory, the pressure to “break the black-box” 
can be expected to increase further over time.  Piercing the 
State veil may well prove to be an enduring adaptation of the 
procedural framework of international law, leading to greater 
efficacy of international norms. 
B. An Emerging Alternative Model: State Organ Obligation 
Our precursory reading of the alternative model of State or-
gan obligation that may replace black-box theory can be 
summed up in five interrelated points: (1) international obliga-
tions oblige States as well as their organs; (2) States retain the 
international responsibility for international law violations in 
order to efficiently enforce international legal obligations; (3) 
the State retains a high level of control over the fulfillment of 
its international obligations; (4) a distinction should be made 
  
 263. Andrew Hurrell, Conclusion; International Law and the Changing Con-
stitution of International Society, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 327, 
338 (Michael Byers ed. 2000). 
 264. See GAJA, supra note 19, at 7 (“Should one accept the view that inter-
national law confers rights and obligations on individuals, it seems reasonable 
to hold that international law may also impose obligations on specific State 
organs.”). 
 265. See Eric Stein, International Law in Internal Law: Toward Interna-
tionalization of Central-Eastern European Constitutions?, 88 AM. J. INT’L L. 
427, 450 (1994).  Eric Stein explains that:  
Despite the pervasive mutation in the international system, the state 
is not about to “whither away.”  Yet, because of this mutation, one 
may question the continued functionality of the rule that a state is 
free, subject only to the broad international “good faith” standard, to 
choose the ways and means of implementing a treaty to which it is a 
party, and specifically to determine whether a treaty should or should 
not directly apply in its internal legal order.  Unfettered discretion in 
the hands of national political institutions is particularly problematic 
in the case of treaties aimed at granting rights to, and imposing obli-
gations upon, individuals.   
Id.  See also Simma, supra note 240, at 325. 
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between State organs’ positive and negative obligations; and (5) 
an alternative model needs to incorporate the reality that in 
case of conflicts State organs will generally continue to abide by 
national law at the State level rather than follow their interna-
tional obligations.  
First, the international obligations of State organs exist par-
allel to those of the State, not in isolation.266  As a general rule, 
we can paraphrase the ICJ in LaGrand and say that organs are 
bound under international law to comply with the international 
undertakings of their States, whatever form they take.267   
Second, international responsibility for a violation of interna-
tional obligations must in principle still be invoked against the 
State as an entity.  The fact that many international obligations 
can be fulfilled by different State organs, which oftentimes de-
pend on each other to do so, makes it generally unfeasible to 
invoke the international responsibility of a specific organ.  Nei-
ther Germany nor the U.S. would benefit if Germany was to 
invoke the responsibility of the U.S. government, the Governor 
of Arizona and the U.S. Supreme Court separately before the 
ICJ in a case like LaGrand.268  Separate international responsi-
bility seems desirable only when a violation can be attributed 
exclusively to one organ in limited circumstances.  For example, 
it may be desirable when the organ in question is unwilling to 
remedy the violation and cannot be forced to comply by its cen-
tral government, as in the case of the Manx legislature in 
Tyrer,269 or in specific consent-based regimes.270 
  
 266. Cf. Fitzmaurice, supra note 20, at 88 (“It is only by treating the State 
as one indivisible entity, and the discharge of the international obligations 
concerned as being incumbent on that entity as such, and not merely on par-
ticular individuals or organs, that the supremacy of international law can be 
assured — the atomization of the personality of State is necessarily fatal to 
this.”). 
 267. See LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, at para. 32.  
 268. But see Peter J. Spiro, Federalism and International Law: A Third 
Account, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 93RD ANNUAL MEETING  OF  THE AMERICAN 
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 246, 247 (noting that: “[S]ubnational respon-
sibility would...lead the states to respect international obligations within the 
sphere of their authorities.”).   
 269. See supra Part II. 
 270. Cf. Art. 25 (1) and (3) Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 17 
U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 (allowing subdivisions to participate in arbitra-
tion in their own right with consent of their State). 
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That State responsibility remains unaltered does not pre-
clude the invocation of State organ responsibility on the na-
tional plane.  Where the responsibility of organs for their obli-
gations under national law can be invoked, be it by individuals 
or by other organs,271 there is no reason why the same could not 
be done for their international obligations.272   
Third, the State, represented by the executive and the legisla-
ture, retains a high level of control over the fulfillment of its 
international obligations, for example, by implementing and 
enforcing legislation.273  The fact that State organs are bound by 
the international obligations of their State does not mean that 
they are deaf to national instructions on how to fulfill those ob-
ligations.274  The freedom of implementation remains largely 
intact, especially for less detailed obligations. 
That the State normally preserves its controlling role is 
clearly shown in the final judgment in LaGrand.275  While the 
circumstances surrounding the LaGrand brothers’ executions 
warranted the pronunciation of the Governor of Arizona’s obli-
gation to halt the second execution, the ICJ recognized the free-
dom of the U.S. to determine how to remedy possible future vio-
lations.276  The ICJ did not name any specific U.S. organs, but 
imposed a duty on the U.S. to allow review and reconsideration 
of future convictions in violation of the Consular Treaty by a 
means of its own choosing.277  Similarly, the state’s preservation 
of control was a determining factor in the Subpoena decision of 
the ICTY Appeals Chamber.278 
Fourth, a distinction must be made between positive and 
negative obligations of State organs, as attempted by the Brus-
  
 271. See JEROME B. ELKIND, INTERIM PROTECTION: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
203–08 (1981).   
 272. See Beth Stephens, Human Rights Accountability: Congress, Federal-
ism and International Law, 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 277, 285–86 (2000).    
 273. McFadden, supra note 8, at 32 (1995).  
 274. See, e.g., Grootboom v. Oostenberg Municipality, 1999 (3) BCLR 277 
(High Court of South Africa, Cape of Good Hope Provincial Division), avail-
able at http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/Diana/fulltext/groot.doc (last visited 
Oct. 6, 2003) (combining respect for international obligations with deference to 
the government in their implementation). 
 275. LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 104, at paras. 123, 124.  
 276. Id. at para. 124. 
 277. Id. at paras. 125, 128(6). 
 278. Blaskic, Review, supra note 211, para. 127.  
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sels Court of Appeals in Vermeire.279  As shown in the comments 
of the ECHR on that decision, however, the line is not easily 
drawn.280  Contrary to the common understanding of these cate-
gories, it is submitted here that the proper distinction in the 
context of State organ obligation is not between action and re-
straint from action, but between the implementation of an in-
ternational obligation in general and the prevention of a spe-
cific, imminent violation of international law.    
The latter, negative obligation must apply to all organs, re-
gardless of the wording or content of the international norm.281  
Whenever a State organ is confronted with an imminent viola-
tion of international law in the normal conduct of its duties, it 
has an international obligation to prevent that violation by 
whatever action or omission lies within its authority.282  Thus, 
the governors involved in Breard, LaGrand and Avena became 
the subject of negative international obligations that would oth-
erwise not concern them because it was in their power to pre-
vent an imminent violation.  
On the other hand, the positive obligation to take general 
steps for implementation is more limited and depends on the 
specific content and language of the norm.  The obligation must 
be specific enough to determine both the steps to be taken, and 
the organs that are to take them.283  In order to determine 
whether these requirements are met, a factual determination is 
necessary in each specific case, taking into account the position 
of the organs involved and the context of the international obli-
  
 279. Vermeire, 214–C Eur. Ct. H.R. at para. 11.  
 280. Id. at para. 26. 
 281. See SHABTAI ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW OF TREATIES, 1945–
1986, 40 (1989) [hereinafter ROSENNE, DEVELOPMENTS]. 
 282. Cf. id. at 39 (“It is axiomatic that a treaty, made between States, is 
binding upon each State as a whole, upon each one of its organs.  This is im-
plicit in the lapidary formulation of the pacta sunt servanda rule in article 26 
of the Vienna Conventions.”); Christian Tomuschat, What is a “Breach” of the 
European Convention on Human Rights?, in THE DYNAMICS OF THE 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPE, 315, 320 (R. Lawson et al. eds., 
1994) [hereinafter Tomuschat, What is a “Breach” of the E.C.H.R.?]. 
 283. The IACHR, for example, has given numerous orders that are so spe-
cific that they effectively result in direct communication between the Court 
and certain State organs.  See, e.g., “La Nacion” Newspaper case, Provisional 
Measures, 26 August 2002, paras. 2–3 (Costa Rican court asking the IACHR 
for clarification of an order to suspend a judgment).  See also PASQUALUCCI, 
supra note 108, at  250–53.  
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gation.284  Generally, positive obligations can be derived more 
often from obligations of conduct than from obligations of re-
sult,285 but positive obligations cannot simply be equated to obli-
gations of conduct.  
The fact that a norm can be carried out by more than one or-
gan does not preclude positive obligations, although it does 
make a resulting positive obligation less feasible.  A specific 
enough norm may create simultaneous positive obligations, al-
lowing different State organs to achieve the same result.  The 
action of one disposes of the obligations of the other.  In such 
cases, the time that has elapsed since the introduction of the 
international obligation and the inaction of the other organs 
involved may be taken into account in assessing the existence of 
positive obligations, as demonstrated by the Argentinean case 
of Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich.286    
Article 14(1) of the American Convention of Human Rights 
establishes a right of reply to offensive public statements.287  
Argentina ratified the Convention in 1984, but subsequently 
failed to regulate the right of reply in its domestic law.288  In 
1988, the Argentinean Supreme Court ruled that it could not 
enforce the Convention in the absence of implementing law, 
  
 284. Cf. Tomuschat, What is a “Breach” of the E.C.H.R.?, supra note 282, at 
324 (“[T]he basic obligation, by meandering through different stages of elabo-
ration and implementation, can take different substantive forms.”). 
 285. See Draft Articles on State Responsibility, [1996] 2:2 Y.B. INT’L COMM’N 
60, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/ Add.1 (part 2), art. 20 and 21.  These draft 
articles have not been included in the final Articles on State Responsibility of 
the ILC of 2001, but the distinction between obligations of conduct and result 
is implicitly reflected in the reference to the character of obligations in final 
article 12, and elaborated on in the Commentary.  
 286. Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich, CSJIN 315 Fallos 1492 (1992) (S.Ct. of Argen-
tina) [hereinafter Ekmekdjian].  This Article’s account of the case is largely 
based on Buergenthal, International Tribunals, supra note 9, at 695–99. 
 287. See Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction, Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights, Advisory Opinion OC–7/86 of August 29, 1986, Inter-
Am. C.H.R., ser. A, No.7, para. 20 (1986) (“Anyone injured by inaccurate or 
offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the public in general by a le-
gally regulated medium of communication has the right to reply or to make a 
correction using the same communications outlet, under such conditions as 
the law may establish.”).  
 288. Buergenthal, International Tribunals, supra note 9, at 695. 
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since the phrase “under such conditions as the law may estab-
lish” made Article 14 a non-self-executing provision.289  
In the 1992, the Supreme Court of Argentina reversed course 
in the landmark decision of Ekmekdjian v. Sofovich and found 
that Article 14(1) was directly enforceable under Argentinean 
law.290  In reaching this conclusion, the Court relied on an Advi-
sory Opinion of the Inter-American Court,291 the American Con-
vention, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the 
Argentinean Constitution.292  The Court’s reasoning was rather 
unorthodox.293  The Court determined that the adoption of a law 
that conflicted with treaty obligations would infringe on the 
executive’s treaty power and was, therefore, unconstitutional.294  
The Court departed from the then prevailing “last in time” rule 
and held that treaties override ordinary national laws.295  Since 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties ranked higher 
than national law, the provision in Article 27 that “a party may 
not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
its failure to perform a treaty” effectively required all State or-
gans “to accord normative priority to treaties and imposed on 
them the obligation to emit the necessary regulations to ensure 
that treaty provisions be fully implemented.”296 
  
 289. See id.  (The 1988 case is Ekmekdjian v. Neustadt, Supreme Court of 
Argentina, Case No. E. 60. XXII, Judgment of December 1, 1988).  
 290. Id.  
 291. Id. at 696. 
 292. See id. at 697–99; see also Ekmekdjian, supra note 286, at paras. 17–
21. 
 293. See Burgenthal, International Tribunals, supra note 9, at 697. 
 294. See id. at 698. 
 295. Id. at 697. 
 296. Id. at 698.  See also Ekmekdjian, supra note 286, at para. 19.  The Su-
preme Court of Argentina explained: 
Que la necesaria aplicación del art. 27 de la Convención de Viena im-
pone a los órganos del Estado argentino asignar primacía al tratado 
ante un eventual conflicto con cualquier norma interna contraria o 
con la omisión de dictar disposiciones que, en sus efectos, equivalgan 
al incumplimiento del tratado internacional en los términos del citado 
art. 27.  
[That the necessary application of article 27 of the Vienna Conven-
tion places an obligation upon the organs of the Argentine State to 
give primacy to the treaty in the event that a conflict arises with any 
contrary provision of domestic law or in the event it has omitted to 
enact provisions and that such omission, in its effects, is tantamount 
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While relying in part on the Constitution, the Supreme Court 
stated, in broad language, that international law imposes ex-
tensive obligations on State organs.297  The Court ruled that Ar-
ticle 2 of the American Convention, requiring States’ parties to 
adopt “such legislative or other measures as may be necessary,” 
includes appropriate judicial decrees as a means to give effect to 
the rights and freedoms in the Convention.298  The Court, there-
fore, found itself under the obligation to remedy the inaction of 
the legislature and regulate the right of reply through such de-
crees.299 
In Ekmekdjian, the right of reply was to be exercised “under 
such conditions as the law may establish.”300  This rule seemed 
to give rise to a positive obligation on the legislature  (and pos-
sibly the judiciary branch) to establish a legal regime that al-
lowed for the right of reply, and a negative obligation on all 
other organs to prevent specific violations of this right.301  In its 
1988 decision, the Argentinean Supreme Court deferred to the 
  
to non-observance of the international treaty under the terms set out 
in article 27.] 
Id. 
 297. See Buergenthal, International Tribunals, supra note 9, at 698. 
 298. See id. at 696–97. 
 299. See id. at 697–98.  See also Ekmekdjian, supra note 286, paras. 20, 22.  
In more general terms, the Court held that: 
Que en el mismo orden de ideas, debe tenerse presente que cuando la 
Nación ratifica un tratado que firmó con otro Estado, se obliga inter-
nacionalmente a que sus órganos administrativos y jurisdiccionales lo 
apliquen a los supuestos que ese tratado contemple, siempre que 
contenga descripciones lo suficientemente concretas de tales supues-
tos de hechos que hagan posible su aplicación inmediata.  Una norma 
es operativa cuando está dirigida a una situación de la realidad en la 
que puede operar inmediatamente, sin necesidad de instituciones que 
deba establecer el Congreso.   
[It should be borne in mind that when the Nation ratifies a treaty, 
which it has signed with another State, it is making an international 
commitment that its administrative and jurisdictional bodies will ap-
ply that treaty to the cases covered thereby, provided that it contains 
sufficiently specific descriptions of such cases to permit its immediate 
application.  A rule is effective when it addresses an actual situation 
within which it can operate directly, without the need for institutions 
which have to be established by Congress.] 
Id. at para. 20. 
 300. Ekmekdjian, supra note 286, at paras. 21–22.   
 301. See Buergenthal, International Tribunals,  supra note 9, at 697–98.  
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legislature to establish a legal regime.302  However, when in 
1992 the legal regime had still not been enacted, the Court 
found that the inaction of the legislature prompted a positive 
obligation on the Court to regulate the right of reply.303  Thus, 
the time elapsed, together with the failure of the legislature, 
strengthened the positive obligation of the Court to formulate a 
legal regime for the right of reply, also forming a logical corol-
lary of the negative obligation of the Court to prevent a viola-
tion of the right in that specific case.304        
Fifth, the international obligations of State organs will not 
trump national law at the State level, at least not in the fore-
seeable future.305  In case of conflict, national courts and other 
organs generally will continue to follow national rules on the 
hierarchy of national and international law.306  Of course, the 
familiar rule that national law cannot excuse the violation of an 
international obligation will apply, and favoring national law 
over international obligations will result in State responsibility 
on the international plane.  
The lack of supremacy primarily serves as a practical predic-
tion.  States will resist the move from black-box theory to State 
organ obligation more vehemently when it is coupled with the 
automatic supremacy of international law on the national 
plane.307  State organs will be hesitant to disregard the national 
law that instituted them and provides the most direct means of 
accountability.308    
  
 302. See supra note 296. 
 303. Id. at 698. 
 304. Id. at 695–98. 
 305. As stated earlier, obligation and rank should be treated as two differ-
ent issues.  See supra Part II. 
 306. Id.  Cf. Alford, supra note 48, at  736 (“If a statute admits of only one 
interpretation, courts must give effect to that interpretation, whether or not it 
violates a pre-existing international obligation.”).  
 307. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 31, at 150 (describing the U.S. refusal to 
follow international law when it is “inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution.”).  
 308. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16 (“[N]o agreement with a foreign na-
tion can confer power on the Congress, or on any other branch of Government, 
which is free from the restraints of the Constitution.”).  Cf. John H. Jackson, 
Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 310, 333  (1992) (“[C]ourts will often strive to seek a ‘way out’ from the 
rigidities and other policy problems they face when a…[direct application and 
higher status] rule exists in a legal system.”). 
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However, many scholars will also value the lack of supremacy 
of international norms on the national plane as an important 
check on the making and application of international law.309  
After all, the shortcomings of international law are well-known.  
Principal among them are a claimed lack of legitimacy, democ-
ratic or otherwise, and a lack of accountability of the actors that 
apply them.310  These problems raise doubts regarding the desir-
ability of an automatic superior status for the international ob-
ligations of State organs.311  Moreover, withholding superior 
status might lead to closer interaction between national and 
international courts.  This interaction can induce development 
and improvement of international law, as was demonstrated 
when the European national courts refused to uphold European 
law due to its lack of attention to human rights.312  
At the same time, a lack of supremacy clearly diminishes the 
effects of State organ obligation.  If international law developed 
to a more perfect state, supremacy would certainly be desirable.  
Until that time, a balance must be found between conflicting 
interests.313  Organs will generally follow the commands of na-
tional law when it conflicts with international obligations, and 
occasionally will disregard national laws to favor international 
law.  The development of a limited class of international obliga-
tions that do require supremacy on the national plane may de-
velop, such as jus cogens norms.  Again, this theory is one of 
several different possible scenarios.  The likelihood and desir-
ability of separate or parallel obligations of the State and its 
organs, the possible international responsibility of organs and 
the rank of their international obligations on the national plane 
are up for discussion and may change over time.  Also, there are 
various open questions that will have to be determined in prac-
tice.  Where do we draw the line between positive and negative 
obligations?  To what extent should organs heed international 
obligations that do not immediately touch upon their daily rou-
tine?  
  
 309. See Jackson, supra note 308, at 340. 
 310. See Kälin, supra note 236, at 119.  See also Turley, supra note 256, at 
204–05.   
 311. Jackson, supra note 308, at 338 (advising “caution” in implementing 
higher status treaties).  
 312. See supra Part III.B.1. 
 313. For examples of different State systems, see Jackson, supra note 308.  
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State organs themselves will answer many of these questions.  
Understanding the full potential of the model of State organ 
obligation requires a change of perspective in approaching the 
addressees of international obligations.  To return to our anal-
ogy of the walled town: the question normally posed is whether 
international law is allowed to look over the walls into the town.  
An equally valid and more constructive question is whether the 
organs inside the town are required or even allowed to ignore 
what is going on outside the town walls.314  This perspective 
warrants a bottom-up, rather than a top-down approach.  In 
other words, the issue is whether the model of State organ obli-
gation provides a workable structure in practice for the organs 
themselves, not whether it can be imposed in full detail upon 
them.   
When given the chance, State organs, especially courts, are 
often willing to look over the town walls and uphold interna-
tional obligations.  This phenomenon is evidenced by the ex-
perience in the European Union and the fact that courts all over 
the world already interpret national law in conformity with in-
ternational law.315  As argued earlier in this article, State organ 
obligation may play an important role in further promoting that 
willingness.  This assertion is especially relevant with regard to 
judges, who are trained to distinguish binding norms from non-
binding ones.316   
More important, breaking the black-box effectively removes 
the barriers in many cases where organs already want to heed 
the call of international law.  It reverses the current presump-
  
 314. Cf. Buergenthal, International Tribunals, supra note 9, at 698 (com-
menting on Ekmekdjian that since the Argentine Supreme Court “knew what 
Argentina’s international obligations were, it thought it only proper to give 
effect to them.”).  
 315. See Gerrit Betlem & André Nollkaemper, Giving Effect to Public Inter-
national Law and European Community Law before Domestic Courts: A Com-
parative Analysis of the Practice of Consistent Interpretation, 14 EURO. J. OF 
INT’L L. 569, 574–75 (2003); Benvenisti, Judges and Foreign Affairs, supra 
note 9, at 428. 
 316. Dieter Grimm, Constitutional Adjudication and Democracy, 33 ISR. L. 
REV. 193, 205 (1999) (stating “judges are bound to the prescribed norms, and 
their task is to discover the content of these norms and to apply them.”).  Cf. 
Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1460 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (“It would be quite im-
proper for the judiciary to disregard international obligations that are insepa-
rable from our nationhood.”). 
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tion of non-validity of international obligations for State organs.  
Accordingly, the burden of proof shifts in favor of the applica-
tion of international law.  State organs must ask themselves not 
whether the State empowers them to obey international law, 
but whether the State prevents them from doing so.  This de-
velopment has three important effects.  
First, even without supremacy, State organ obligation en-
sures the execution of international law where there is no con-
flict with national law, which, as noted, is often.317  State organs 
continuously exercise discretion in the performance of their du-
ties.  Some of the highest national courts have discretion re-
garding whether or not they will review a case, while all courts 
exercise discretion from time to time when interpreting national 
law or filling a gap in the law.318  The executive branch and leg-
islatures’ freedom to act is even more apparent.  National law 
frequently instructs State organs to act in an equitable manner, 
giving them discretion that is to be applied in a reasonable 
way.319  As Lord Scarman implied in Attorney-General v. British 
Broadcasting Corporation,320 many violations of international 
obligations may be prevented if State organs are bound by in-
ternational law in exercising their discretion.321 
  
 317. See supra Part II. 
 318. For example, in the U.S., the Supreme Court has the ultimate ability to 
grant certiorari to hear a case.  
 319. See generally Attorney General v. British Broadcasting Corporation, 3 
All E.R. 161 (H.L. 1980) (analyzing the case at hand in an equitable manner 
and noting the court’s discretion in such matters).   
 320. Id.   
 321. Id. at 177–78 (noting that where a court had to decide a “question of 
legal policy,” it had to regard and uphold the United Kingdom’s international 
obligations under the Convention as interpreted by the European Court of 
Human Rights).  See also Lord Butler-Sloss in Derbyshire County Council v. 
Times Newspapers Limited, 1 Q.B. 770, 830 (1992).  In Derbyshire County 
Council, the Court explained: 
[T]he principles governing the duty of the English court to take ac-
count of article 10 [ECHR] appear to be as follows: where the law is 
clear and unambiguous, either stated as the common law or enacted 
by Parliament, recourse to article 10 is unnecessary and inappropri-
ate.  Consequently, the law of libel in respect of individuals does not 
require the court to consider the Convention.  But where there is an 
ambiguity, or the law is otherwise unclear or so far undeclared by an 
appellate court, the English court is not only entitled but…obliged to 
consider the implications of article 10.   
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Second, State organ obligation eliminates many violations of 
international law that are caused by negligence rather than an 
intent to breach.  States regularly fail to implement their obli-
gations not because they oppose them, but because they are not 
aware of all of the steps to be taken, their legislative process is 
too slow, or simply because they have other priorities.322  When 
international obligations address State organs directly, the un-
intended absence of a national “trigger” no longer precludes 
their execution.  Of course, State organs can still be negligent, 
but when each organ itself is addressed by international law, 
chances increase that failure to respect the law by one organ 
will be remedied by others.   
Third, in cases where States do want to preclude the execu-
tion of their international obligations, they will have to act.  
State organs, especially courts, often lack the political agenda of 
the central government that determines the course of action of 
the State.323  While this problem sometimes works to the detri-
ment of international law, (for example, in the Consular Rela-
tions cases); on other occasions, it makes specific organs more 
vigilant than their State in the treatment of international obli-
gations, (for example, as demonstrated in the Pinochet case).  
Under the black-box theory, States can simply ignore inconven-
ient international obligations, knowing that their courts and 
officials will do the same.324  Under a model of State organ obli-
gation, States will have to issue explicit instructions to their 
organs in order to prevent the application of a given interna-
tional norm.  This scenario facilitates both the determination of 
violations of international law and their redress on the interna-
tional plane.  
C. Policy Considerations 
From the standpoint of international law the concept of State 
organ obligation provides a welcome opportunity to improve 
  
Id. 
 322. See, e.g., Ekmekdjian, supra note 286, at para. 20; Vermeire, 214–C 
Eur. Ct. H.R. at paras. 10, 24 (containing situations in which national courts 
applied international law as a means of rectifying a flaw or omission in do-
mestic law where the legislature was negligent rather than opposed to the 
international obligation).  
 323. See Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 9, at 335.  
 324. See Stephens, supra note 272, at 293–94.   
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compliance, but its impact on the national legal order raises 
profound questions.325  Some of these are flaws of international 
law itself, like the lack of democratic legitimacy, accountability, 
precision and completeness. 
An additional factor that may raise doubts as to whether it is 
desirable to have State organs directly obligated to obey inter-
national judgments is the possibility of error in those judg-
ments.  Such an error may result either from the present imper-
fect and unsystematic state of international adjudication or the 
distance between international adjudicators and local situa-
tions, and cannot generally, in the absence of correctional 
mechanisms, be easily remedied.326     
Additionally, some may protest that the concept of State or-
gan obligation threatens State autonomy.  The black-box theory 
is generally supported with reference to the sovereign equality 
of States and the autonomy they need to represent their inter-
ests on the international plane.327  The direct obligation of State 
organs is thought to infringe on the State’s right to execute in-
ternational obligations in the way it deems most suitable.328  As 
  
 325. See Justice Michael Kirby, The Road From Bangalore, The First Ten 
Years of Bangalore Principles on the Domestic Application of International 
Human Rights Norms, Address before the Conference on the 10th Anniversary 
of Bangalore Principles (Dec. 28, 1998) (transcript available at 
http://www.lawfoundation.net.au/resources/Kirby/papers/19981226_html (last 
visited Sept. 10, 2003)).  
 326. See Philippe Sands, After Pinochet: The Proper Relationship Between 
National and International Courts, in THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM IN 
QUEST OF EQUITY AND UNIVERSALITY: LIBER AMICORUM GEORGES ABI-SAAB 699, 
714–15 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Vera Gowlland-Debbas eds., 
Kluwer Law International 2001); Martti Koskenniemi, The Post-Adjudicative 
Phase: Judicial Error and Limits of Law, in INCREASING THE EFFECTIVENESS 
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE ICJ/UNITAR 
COLLOQUIUM TO CELEBRATE THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE COURT 347–57 
(Connie Peck & Roy S.K. Lee eds., 1997). See also the opinion of Justice 
Richardson in R v. Jefferies [1994] 1 N.Z.L.R. 290, 299.  Cf. Cassel, Judicial 
Remedies, supra note 10, at  886–87. 
 327. See Blaskic, Review, supra note 211, at para. 41. 
 328. See McFadden, supra note 8, at 47.  McFadden concludes that: 
[The] black-box theory makes a great deal of sense, from a global per-
spective, because it recognizes both the fact and legitimacy of states 
having organized themselves in different ways.  It would be an un-
warranted interference in domestic affairs, as well as impractical, to 
require that specific institutions carry out international obligations.   
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a reaction to this threat to State autonomy, States may be more 
reluctant to enact international law.329 
Finally, there is the distorting effect of State organ obligation 
on the internal relationship between the organs in matters of 
federalism and the separation of powers.  This distortion may 
allow the executive to overstep its authority, for example by 
imposing undue obligations on courts via treaties.330  In the 
same vein, the balance of powers between the federal govern-
ment and the states may be disrupted.  Therefore, mediation by 
the legislature might be required to prevent organs that make 
or apply international law from asserting an unwarranted 
dominance over others. 
All these concerns are mitigated to a great extent by the 
rather conservative reading of State organ obligation intro-
duced earlier in this Article.  The fallout from the breaking of 
the black-box will be limited, because the State will retain vast 
control over the implementation of its obligations.331  Nonethe-
  
Id.  McFadden also proceeds to point out that the black-box theory’s applica-
tion is flawed when applied to the internal organization of the U.S.  It is to be 
noted, however, that his rejection of the theory rests largely on the specific 
constitutional structure of the U.S. and not on the normative force of interna-
tional law itself.  Id.  Therefore, in the specific case of the U.S., McFadden 
argues that the State-created exceptions defeat the rule, but does not render 
the black-box theory obsolete in general.  Id.  
 329. See Jackson, supra note 308, at 331.  But see Michael Kirby, The Im-
pact of International Human Rights Norms — A “Law Undergoing Evolution,” 
Judge’s Conference (Mar. 11, 1995), available at http://www.lawfoundation. 
net/au/Resources/kirby/papers/19950311_tempo.html (last visited Sept. 2, 
2003)).  As Michael Kirby explains: 
Giving effect to international law where a country has formally rati-
fied a relevant treaty, does no more than give substance to the act 
which the executive government has taken.  The knowledge that the 
judicial use of international law in this way is now becoming more 
frequent may have the beneficial consequence of discouraging ratifi-
cation where there is no serious intention to accept, for the nation, 
the principles contained in the treaty. 
Id. 
 330. Or vice versa; see ROGERS, supra note 42, at 215 (“To say that the 
courts have an additional body of  “higher law” to apply, to be found in the 
whole amorphous body of customary international law, is to inject an enor-
mously distorting overdose of additional power into the Judicial Branch.”). 
 331. See, e.g., Grootboom, 1999 (3) BCLR 277; see also Jackson, supra note 
308, at 334–38 (explaining various approaches to limit the automatic suprem-
acy of international law).  
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less, concerns about sovereignty and supremacy are real, as 
demonstrated by the strong reaction of the Australian legisla-
ture to the famous Teoh case.332  The Australian High Court’s 
holding in Teoh, which stated that unincorporated treaties can 
give rise to legitimate expectations of individuals that adminis-
trative decisionmakers will respect the treaty, provoked a fierce 
debate on the place of international law in the national legal 
order.  The opposition of the Australian legislature to the doc-
trine of legitimate expectations reflected serious concerns about 
national control over the domestic effects of international law 
and the proper balance between the different branches of gov-
ernment.333  While these problems cannot properly be discussed 
within the limits of this Article, two observations seem perti-
nent. 
First, none of these problems is the immediate result of a 
move towards State organ obligation.  They are existing prob-
lems that play out sharper in a model of direct, rather than in-
direct obligation.  For the flaws in the law itself, this is obvious.  
The autonomy of States in implementing their international 
obligations is limited because States have consciously chosen to 
restrict their autonomy by enacting treaties that formulate spe-
cific demands for their implementation.  Moreover, interna-
tional law not only prescribes how the internal organization of a 
State is to be used for the implementation of specific obliga-
tions, it is also in the process of formulating more general de-
mands on the State in shaping its internal organization.334 
Likewise, the tension between federalism and an effective 
approach to international law335 results from the material devel-
  
 332. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v. Teoh (1995) 183 C.L.R. 
273.  See Jonathan Todres, Emerging Limitations on the Rights of the Child: 
The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and Its Early Case Law, 30 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 159, 187–88 (1998) (on the introduction of legisla-
tion to reverse the doctrine of legitimate expectations in Teoh). 
 333. See David Kinley & Penny Martin, International Human Rights Law at 
Home: Addressing the Politics of Denial, 26 MELB. U. L. REV. 466, 467 (2002).   
 334. See T.M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 
AM. J. INT’L L. 46 (1992); UCP of Turkey v. Turkey, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 121, 148 
(1998) (“Democracy is without a doubt a fundamental feature of the European 
public order...Democracy thus appears to be the only political model contem-
plated by the Convention and, accordingly, the only one compatible with it.”). 
 335. See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemp-
tive Power of International Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295; Andrew Byrnes & 
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opments in the law rather than from a direct form of obliga-
tion.336 Traditional divisions of powers, whether federal or 
among different branches of the central government, do not go 
well with “the internationalising of the national and the nation-
alising of the international.”337  The growing content of interna-
tional law has brought more power to the central government, 
in particular to the executive, than just the administration of 
foreign affairs.338  
Second, while providing some concrete alleviation of these 
problems, the indirect model of obligation also perpetuates 
them by removing an incentive for more structural change.  
Whether black-box theory is more harmful than helpful is a le-
gitimate question, even taking into account the very problems it 
is believed to mitigate.  The remedy of black-box theory is 
largely a placebo effect.  We are oddly comforted by the idea 
that imperfect international law passes through the hands of 
the legislature before it becomes “real law” in our daily lives.  
As long as international law is “outside” the State, and depend-
ent on our own lawmakers to get in, its imperfections are con-
sidered less troubling.  
However, this sense of security is misleading.  In practice, the 
role of implementing legislation is too constrained to remedy 
serious flaws that result from the drafting or application of in-
ternational law.339  There is too much pressure and too little 
  
Hilary Charlesworth, Federalism and the International Legal Order: Recent 
Developments in Australia, 79 AM. J. INT’L L. 622 (1985); Stephens, supra note 
272, at 277. 
 336. See  Kälin, supra note 236, at 124; Stephens, supra note 272, at 292–
94. 
 337. Allott, supra note 245, at 33.  See Byrnes & Charlesworth, supra note 
335, at 623; Brilmayer, supra note 335, at 330–31.  
 338. But see ROGERS, supra note 42, at 33 (“[T]he conduct of foreign affairs 
is conducted by the political branches in our system, and international law 
practice is in reality a part of the conduct of foreign affairs.”). 
 339. See Kälin, supra note 236, at 123 (“[W]hile the legislature is involved in 
the treaty process, its members have no influence on the content of treaty law. 
Rather, the role of democratic decisionmaking is reduced to saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’ 
to a text negotiated by the executive.”).  See also Peter J. Spiro, Treaties, Ex-
ecutive Agreements and Constitutional Method, 79 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1003 
(2001).  Spiro concludes from the problems of legislating on existing interna-
tional obligations that:  
[B]ecause the domestic effectiveness of trade agreements will always 
depend on implementing legislation, the House should be included in 
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leeway for the legislature to significantly curb the increased 
treaty-making power of the executive branch, especially since 
the power of the executive branch is broader than just the draft-
ing of the treaty text that subsequently passes through the 
hands of the legislature.340  As for content, a meaningful depar-
ture from the international obligation to be implemented will 
quickly lead to a violation on the international level.  Of course, 
a rubber-stamping policy that leaves no substantial choice, even 
when implemented by the greatest democracies, does little to 
further the legitimacy of international obligations.  
The problems under discussion require structural adjust-
ments — either in the making of international law or in the 
manner States deal with international law.  The material 
changes in international law have prompted the first steps to-
wards such adjustments, but not much more.  Federal States, 
for example, have established or enhanced the participation of 
their state governments in international relations in various 
ways.341  However, these changes have primarily been gradual 
and not the adequate rethinking of the appropriate division of 
powers needed to fit the new reality that international law can 
no longer simply be equated to foreign affairs.342  An important 
factor in this lack of fundamental change is the air of protection 
  
decisionmaking before an international obligation is perfected.  That 
is, the House should not be presented with an international fait-
accompli, which would limit its discretion as a political if not a consti-
tutional matter to consider the obligation before it is entered into, 
and before its rejection would result in a breach with possibly serious 
costs for the nation.  
Id. 
 340. Uncontrolled by the legislature, the executive can alter obligations 
under a treaty by unilateral statements.  See W. Michael Reisman, Necessary 
and Proper: Executive Competence to Interpret Treaties, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 
316, 319–20, 329 (1990).  
 341. See Kälin, supra note 236, at 127–28 (describing the participation in 
treaty-making of sub-State governments in European countries).  See also 
supra, note 37 on the role of sub-State entities in treaty-making. 
 342. See Kirby, The Road From Bangalore, supra note 325 (“Federal 
constitutions must themselves adapt to the world in which the federal state 
now finds itself.  This, indisputably, is a world of increasing interrelationships 
in matters of economics and of human rights.  Judges, no more than 
legislatures and governments, can ignore this reality.”).  Cf. Swaine, supra 
note 122, at 533 (“The legal trappings of global affairs, including the principle 
of good faith, should not be ignored...attention must be paid to their 
implications for the international function of federal government.”). 
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that emanates from the idea that international law only takes 
effect within a State through a permissive rule of national 
law.343  
States are probably more willing to confront the flaws in in-
ternational law and structural adjustments in their division of 
authority with respect to international law when the effects of 
that law appear more directly.  A cautious, gradual move to-
wards State organ obligation may, therefore, be a welcome cata-
lyst to a more vigorous approach to existing problems rather 
than a source of new tensions between international law and 
national actors.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The international obligations of State organs form a peculiar 
topic of academic debate. Everyone agrees that “the State” is 
bound by its international obligations, but the unison ends with 
this meaningless abstraction.  While some scholars insist that 
organs, as part of the State, are bound by international obliga-
tions, other scholars are equally emphatic in their denial of 
State organ obligation.  The latter are undoubtedly in the ma-
jority.  Both in theory and in practice, the State is still pre-
dominantly treated as a black-box, which shields its organs 
from the reach of international law. 
We have, however, brought together a diverse set of judg-
ments from international courts that challenge the black-box 
view of international law.  While not a new phenomenon, the 
speed of this change is increasing.  The involvement of different 
international courts, in addition to domestic courts, represents 
a further step away from black-box theory.  The material 
changes in international law, which fuel the drift away from 
black-box theory, make it likely that this trend will continue.  
We have laid out a rather conservative model of State organ 
obligation that may change places with black-box theory and 
become rule rather than exception.  Many aspects of State or-
gan obligation, such as separate international responsibility for 
State organs and the relationship between international and 
national obligations of State organs, warrant further discussion 
and may develop over time.  Also, further refinement of the con-
  
 343. See HENKIN, supra note 31, at 153.   
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cept of State organ obligation requires that a distinction be 
made between different forms of obligation and different State 
organs.  This Article has taken a rather broad approach to State 
organ obligation in order to give a wide-ranging overview of 
relevant developments.  
Eventually, direct obligation of State organs under interna-
tional law will improve compliance with international law.  Di-
rect obligation also has its drawbacks, but these could well 
prove to be a blessing in disguise by providing a stronger impe-
tus for States to remedy deficiencies both in international law 
and their handling of it.  In any case, the trend towards State 
organ obligation is real, relevant and deserves further atten-
tion.  
 
